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The purpose of terror, said Lenin, is to terrify. He might have strengthened 
the observation, while weakening the aphorism, by remarking that its 
greater purpose is to sabotage the orderly administration of government by 
forcing those who govern into a defensive position in which nothing can 
be accomplished without the continual, crippling presence of an armed 
guard. Its secondary effect, if not its purpose, is to induce a 
counterterrorism that serves the rebel cause better than any stratagem the 
rebels themselves could devise.1 
A. OBJECTIVES AND KEY CLAIMS 
The overall objective of this thesis is to shed light on the causes for and 
recurrence of such terrorist phenomena as the London transit bombings. This thesis 
makes three central claims: that a British policy of multiculturalism enables the actions of 
a new generation of “homegrown” jihadis; that the evolution of jihadi thought through 
the ages has resulted in a situation in which Islamic extremists find justification for 
indiscriminate targeting such as occurred in the London transit bombings; and that 
various socio-economic factors may at least indicate likely problems – if they aren’t 
actually causal. 
Attacks on the scale of 7-7, 7-21, and the 2006 airline plot appear to be somewhat 
unique to the United Kingdom, at least as terrorism has manifested itself in Western 
countries to date. This is not to say that attacks of a similar nature have not or will not 
occur in the future in other Western nations. Quite to the contrary – the authors see this as 
a trend that is a clear warning that Western governments must address key policies and 
grievances concerning their growing Muslim populations. Failure to do so will only result 
in an increasing discontent, disparity, and isolation of this key population – as has already 
occurred in the United Kingdom. Our focus on the United Kingdom is based on the 
occurrence of three high profile attacks or plots within a significantly short period of 
time.  
In the case of the United Kingdom, the three case studies are not the simple 
manifestation of frustration over the British government’s Middle East policy 
                                                 
1 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey’s, 2002), 100. 
2 
(specifically regarding Iraq), as some would argue. This is as simplistic and uninformed 
as the unreasoning fear that all Muslims in the United Kingdom are against the West. 
While Middle East policy may have contributed to these events, the basis of the events is 
somewhat more complex and likely originates from policies implemented and 
immigration patterns beginning nearly 30 years prior. Multiple factors, including a policy 
of multiculturalism, a lack of integration of key ethnic groups into a highly homogenous 
society, enormous socio-economic disparity between key populations, the isolation of key 
groups within these populations, and finally the acculturation of small groups within the 
greater British society has resulted in a smaller but separate and distinct society that has 
isolated itself within the greater society of Britain and subordinately within the greater 
Muslim society. This is where the root source of the overall problem lies. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
In order to understand the ideology of the modern jihadi, it is necessary to analyze 
the development of jihadi thought throughout Islam’s history. We conducted an extensive 
review of literature that elaborates on or explains the basis of jihad, the results of which 
can be seen in Chapter II. We contend that the evolution of jihadi ideology is a prime 
contributor to jihadi willingness to attempt to influence non-Muslim nations and 
leadership, and to do so through the active targeting of non-combatants. Without this 
ideological evolution, such attacks as we are now seeing might not be taking place. 
The purpose of Chapters III, IV and V is to analyze the basis for jihadist 
recruiting of Westerners. Specifically, we wanted to determine what factors, if any, could 
be useful in predicting who might attack the country in which they were born (or at the 
bare minimum, the country in which they were raised for a significant portion of their 
lives). Chapter III serves to elaborate on the socio-economic underpinnings of Muslim 
unrest in the UK. The data seems to support the belief that Muslims in the UK react 
differently than members of other minority religions when presented with an opportunity 
to “join” Western society. Chapter IV details the British government’s contribution to 
Muslim disatisfaction through its implementation of multiculturalist policies. These 
policies, implemented with the best of intentions, seem to have served the agenda of 
those who are willing to work the entire system for their own personal objectives. 
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Chapter V ties these two concepts together, and provides insight into Muslim isolation – 
one of the apparent results of melding well-meaning multiculturalism with adverse socio-
economic conditions. 
The case studies developed in Chapter VI are meant to validate the salience of the 
concepts in the preceding chapters. Due to the relatively small sample size (only 40 
individuals were included in the population of plotters, actors, and participants of the 
events) it is difficult to establish causality. In comparison to the total Muslim population 
of the United Kingdom, which numbers over 1.5 million (Figure 1), this admittedly 
seems extremely small. While additional individuals might possibly have been included, 
specific individuals were excluded in some cases as we decided that simple knowledge of 
one of the three plots prior to their taking place or discovery by law enforcement did not 
necessarily constitute participation. As open source information was the only information 
included in this study, consistency between media sources on the role of each individual 
was yet another determining factor for inclusion or exclusion of specific individuals. For 
example, in order to be included, information generally had to be confirmed by multiple 
sources. And, while additional actors might have been included, it would not have 
changed the overall statistical significance of the terror groups in comparison to the 
population of British Muslims as a whole. 
It is important to point out, as our sample size of only 40 individuals clearly does, 
this thesis does not postulate that all Muslims in the United Kingdom are terrorists or that 
they intend to support or conduct terrorists attacks. What this thesis does attempt to do is 
to consider what contributing factors led the Britons who comprise the majority of our 
sample set to attack their own countrymen, and subsequently, what factors may influence 
others to follow in their footsteps. 
Upon further analysis, it is apparent that the tactics of the groups supporting 
further alienation of the Muslim population from the greater populations of the countries 
in which they live are similar to those of the insurgent who recognizes the overall 
struggle is not for territory or cities, but rather for entire populations. Multiple groups and 
organizations, some more overtly aggressive than others, have clearly stated their intent 
to establish (or re-establish, depending on one’s perspective), a caliphate to govern the 
4 
world’s Muslims. These organizations are attempting to capitalize on the ripe 
environments that have been provided them through years of liberal social policies such 
as multiculturalism. Many of these organizations have chosen terror and the 
government’s inevitable response to this threat as their key tactic – exactly as described 
by Robert Taber in this chapter’s opening quotation. 
Some may question our focus on the Muslim population of the United Kingdom, 
suggesting other religious or ethnic populations also in the United Kingdom may be 
living in or experiencing similar economic and other social conditions as described in this 
document, specifically in Chapter II. Our response is straightforward and unabashed: 
members of no other population have conducted such overt and egregious attacks against 
their own country in succession over such a short period of time. Neither the UK’s 
Muslim population, nor the UK’s population as a whole, will benefit from a failure to 
discuss this uncomfortable issue. It is our belief that the only way to address the 
underlying issues is through honest and open discourse. 
Others may question our exclusion of other political and religious violence that 
has occurred in the United Kingdom, specifically the issue of Northern Ireland. Although 
this violence is clearly politically and religiously motivated, it is also clearly related to 
historical grievances between the two parties and is bounded by the geography over 
which these grievances have evolved. As will be discussed in the course of this thesis, 
attacks conducted in the name of Islam against the West are not bounded by geography 
and are not necessarily tied to any one particular motive other than the perceived defense 
of Islam against the apostate or the infidel. 
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II. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD  
A. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD  
Jihadis have traditionally concentrated their efforts on what is to them the “near 
enemy” – generally defined as the apostate leaders of Muslim states. In the past several 
decades, however, there has been a slow but steady shift in operational ideology to 
targeting the “far enemy” – generally defined as the infidel leaders of non-Muslim states, 
without whose support the apostate leaders of Muslim states would not be able to rule. It 
is a simple process to draw a line from the philosophical shift directly to some of the 
more spectacular Islamist attacks against Western targets, including the USS Cole 
bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 
Sudan. These attacks were the result of outsiders to Western culture conducting attacks 
against the West, with the goal of removing support to local apostate Muslim regimes. 
But what can we make of the recent spate of attacks on Westerners by Westerners, such 
as the London Underground bombings and the Madrid train bombing? In this chapter, we 
attempt to accomplish two primary goals: first, describe this philosophical shift; and 
second, describe how the philosophical shift from the near enemy to the far enemy has 
supported the expansion of radical Islam in the West. 
B. IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR JIHAD 
In order to get to the end result, or transnational jihad conducted by Westerners, 
we must first go back to the roots of jihad, and the need for it. The concept of jihad has a 
long, respectable history in the Islamic world, but recent developments (of the last half-
century or so) have worked to morph the concept from what was initially a worthy 
individual pursuit (and sometimes a worthy group pursuit) into something potentially 
much more sinister. The underpinnings can be found in the writings of such historic 
Islamic scholars as Taqi al-Din Ahmad Taymiyya and Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
and their introduction of new ways of interpreting concepts like jahili and what it means 
to be “apostate.” These were merely steps on the path, however. The real transformation 
of jihadi ideology begins somewhat prior to the Islamist revolution of the 1940s and 50s. 
The period of major transformation ends with the widespread adoption of philosophies 
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espoused in the writings of such notables as Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, among 
others. Just as with any group (extremist or otherwise) there have since been – and 
continue to be – minor evolutionary changes in the ideology. However, the seminal 
works of Mawdudi and Qutb have had a profound effect on Islamist thinking worldwide. 
The Islamist view of the world is that most, if not all, current Muslim nations are 
in a state of jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah, as originally described in the Quran, “refers to the 
period of ignorance in which the Meccans lived prior to the revelation [by 
Muhammed].”2 We say “traditionally” because, as with so many other Islamic concepts, 
jahiliyyah has been redefined over the ages. For example, Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703-1791) “rejected the depravity of the prevailing popular beliefs and practices of the 
tribes of the [Arabian] peninsula. He claimed they had reverted back to a state of 
jahiliyyah. As idolators, they deserved death for abandoning Islam.”3 Here, Wahhab 
undertook a quantum leap in Islamic philosophy by asserting that it was possible for 
Muslims to revert back to a state of jahiliyyah. Previously, jahiliyyah had been 
considered to be a very specific period in history, with a well-defined end point.  
Another eminent Islamic thinker, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Taymiyya (1263-1328), 
offered his view on Muslims killing Muslims. He reasoned that although the Mongols 
had converted to Islam, “since the Mongols continued to follow the Yasa legal code of 
Genghis Khan instead of the sharia, they were not real Muslims, but apostates who 
should be punished with death according to the sharia.”4 So, under certain conditions, it 
became acceptable for Muslims to kill other Muslims. Later, Sayyid Qutb (who readily 
acknowledged borrowing from Mawdudi on this point) melded these concepts with 
Mawdudi’s redefinition of jahiliyyah as being “. . . not a period of time. It is a condition 
that is repeated every time society veers from the Islamic way whether in the past, the 
present or the future.”5 Thus, we have the final step – the idea that reverting to a state of 
jahiliyyah is a relatively common occurrence. The problem (for non-Islamists) with this 
                                                 
2 John L. Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 85. 
3 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 8. 
4 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 9. 
5 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 85. 
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new definition, is that it applies across the board to all cultural attributes that exist which 
run counter to Islamic teaching. In fact, about the only acceptable cultural attributes are 
the universals of science and technology (but not the philosophical interpretation of 
scientific findings).6 With this restructuring of the concept of jahiliyyah and the strict 
requirement for the implementation of sharia, it is now possible to declare almost any 
Muslim nation or ruler to be jahili or apostate, and subsequently require their death. The 
struggle against jahili rulers is the point where jihad begins to play a role. 
Muslims have traditionally considered jihad to have two dominent meanings: 
greater jihad and lesser jihad. Specifically, greater jihad refers to “the personal struggle 
that all Muslims go through to resist temptation, to become more righteous individuals, 
and to build a better Muslim community,”7 while the lesser jihad “is commonly 
translated as ‘holy war,’ and refers to the protection of the Muslim community through a 
call to arms.”8 The former is of great personal interest to most Muslims, but the latter is 
one of our topics of concern, so unless otherwise stated, the use of the term “jihad” can 
be taken to mean “lesser jihad.”  
Historically, the call to serve has hit a note with Muslims worldwide, but most 
Muslims choose to execute their “obligation” through the application of money. For 
example, a 2002 report to the United Nations Security Council stated, Saudi Arabia has 
contributed at least $500 million (US), “about 20% of the Saudi GNP,” to al Qaeda in the 
last decade alone.9 However, a small, vocal minority in the Islamic world fulfills the 
obligation by taking part in violent activities. This explains the involvement of all walks 
of Muslims in the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.10 Throughout this 
discussion concerning political and religious violence, it is critical to point out there is no 
differentiation in Islam between politics and religion. In fact, Islam in its truest form is a 
system which governs, often in extreme detail, every aspect of an individual’s life – 
including how they should worship, eat, sleep, interact with non-believers, and are 
                                                 
6 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 85-86. 
7 Glenn E. Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities and Vulnerabilities,” July 
24, 2006, 5-6. 
8 Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy,” 6. 
9 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003), 35, 215. 
10 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82. 
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governed. While we will discuss this in greater detail later, it is vital at this point to 
understand that in Islam, politics and religion are inseparable. Religion acts as the 
overriding authority that guides political actions, policies, and decisions. As will be seen, 
this factor is key to understanding the difficulties inherent in negotiations between Islam 
and the West, and may in fact suggest that the two systems are altogether incompatible. 
The relationship between politics and religion in Islam is also critical to 
understanding the convergence of the two concepts of jahili and jihad – a key aspect of 
the evolution of jihadi thought. Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
attempted to apply Leninist principles to Islamic ideology in order to foment revolution 
in the Muslim world, and specifically in Egypt. Some extreme forms of Islam, to include 
Wahhabi and Salafi variants, view states that don’t live under sharia as being jahiliyyah, 
and leaders who don’t govern accordingly to be apostate. Thus, the basis for the Islamic 
revolution is the recognition that the rulers are jahili. Further, the ideologues’ dedication 
to the Salafi or Wahhabi brands of Islam precludes their involvement in the political 
process as a means of achieving their goals, since working politically inside a jahili 
system is anathema to jihadi ideals. In Qutb’s manner of thinking, “Reform was no 
longer sufficient since it did not deal with the root of the evil that permeates society. Only 
a radical transformation, a totally new beginning . . . the categorical destruction of the old 
system, can guarantee the flourishing of God’s system.”11 From a Western perspective, 
Sam Harris explains this succinctly when he states “Muslims tend to view questions of 
public policy and global conflict in terms of their affiliation with Islam. And Muslims 
who don’t view the world in these terms risk being branded as apostates and killed by 
other Muslims.”12 Islam in the extreme does not concern itself with the separation of 
church and state. As far as radical Islamists are concerned, the church is the state. 
C. JIHAD REDEFINED 
Just as with charismatic lay leaders in any other environment, jihadis frequently 
are largely unqualified to offer religious advice, but that doesn’t stop them from doing so. 
Most of them have received no formal religious instruction, but they are nevertheless 
                                                 
11 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 78. 
12 Sam Harris, Letter To A Christian Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 85. 
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eager to expound on matters of faith. This is a matter of some contention between the 
ulema (Islamic clergy or religious scholars) and the ideologues, with the former feeling 
strongly that discussion of religious matters should be left to those who know what they 
are talking about – the religious scholars.13 There is a recurring theme in extremist Islam 
– the idea that one can take an ancient, well-known concept, with which most Muslims 
are comfortable, and add to its meaning based on requirements to respond to recent 
trends. Current jihadi thought continues along these lines, of imbuing the meaning of 
longstanding, traditional Islamic concepts with new attributes. While there are many 
translations of the Quran into languages other than Arabic, and there is an ongoing rift 
between followers of Sunni and Shia Islam (among others) it is generally understoood 
that there is only one version of the Quran. Still, there is a need to accommodate each 
new aspect of the ever-changing modern world. Further, because there is no one figure in 
the Islamic world with equivalent status to the Catholics’ Pope, for instance, Muslims are 
left to their own devices to apply Quranic instruction to their own daily lives. Where the 
issues become too grand, intricate, cumbersome, or confusing, Muslims look to their 
ulema to help guide their thinking. But again, because of the lack of a single figurehead, 
it is possible for charismatic leaders – both ulema and lay (those with little to no religious 
training) – to exert widely varied influence on the thinking of the Islamic masses. Sayyid 
Qutb typifies this trend. Although he is said to have memorized the Quran by the age of 
ten,14 he never received any formal religious training. Still, his momentous 30-volume 
Quranic commentary “Fi zilal al-Qur’an” (Shades of the Quran) is widely available, and 
“has become the standard by which the Quran’s message is interpreted in many mosques 
and homes throughout the Muslim World.”15 This is a sure sign of its popularity and 
acceptance in otherwise highly censored societies, and exemplifies the respect which is 
given to Muslims with a popular message – whether ulema or lay. 
In accordance with this grand tradition of “putting new wine into old bottles,”16 
modern jihadis have worked hard to transform the concept of jihad in three important 
                                                 
13 Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy,” 4. 
14 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 68. 
15 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 68. 
16 Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy,” 8. 
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ways: by raising it to a status comparable to that of the five traditional pillars of Islam; by 
rejecting the strict interpretation of jihad as defensive in nature; and by decreeing that 
jihad is an individual responsibility (fard ‘ayn).17  
In describing jihad as “the absent duty,” Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag struck a 
strong cultural chord with Muslims. In one fell swoop, he was able to both equate jihad 
with the five pillars (or duties) of Islam and to tap into the deep cultural relevance that 
most Muslims associate with jihad. His ability to co-opt these two core Islamic concepts 
and blend them into one easily remembered meme was a stroke of brilliance. It is not 
doctrinally sound according to classical Islam, which held that “jihad was a collective 
duty that could be activated only if outside enemies threatened or invaded Muslim 
lands.”18 Still, it sounds good, and it is something that the greater Muslim community, or 
umma, can readily pick up. Farag built on that with the theme of apostate local rulers, 
saying “‘They are Muslim only in name, even if they pray, fast, and pretend that they are 
Muslims.’ Therefore, waging jihad against these apostates is a personal duty of every 
Muslim who is capable of fighting, until the former repent or get killed.”19 Notably, it 
was Farag who coined the terms “the near enemy” and “the far enemy,” though he 
stressed the need to address the near enemy before all else.20 
Qutb felt the nature of jihad was a “movement to wipe out tyranny: ‘If we insist 
on calling Islamic jihad a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of the 
word “defense” and mean by it the “defense of man” against those elements which limit 
his freedom. Those elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well as of political 
systems . . .’”21 So, jihad becomes a movement to save man from everything but Islam – 
but only that Islam as defined by enlightened extremists, not the more popular, forgiving 
jahili  Islam practiced by the masses. Thus, what appears to be offensive jihad is actually 
defensive. According to Qutb, any contact between Western religions (specifically 
Christianity and Judaism) was cause for defensive aggression because “they always seek 
                                                 
17 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 3. 
18 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 10. 
19 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 10. 
20 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 44. 
21 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 12. 
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to turn Muslims away from their faith.”22 This concept is key when we come to jihad 
conducted in the West by Westerners. While unprovoked attacks may appear to be 
offensive in nature, according to this convoluted line of reasoning, they are actually 
defensive since they are conducted in response to attacks (or an ongoing attack, or a 
potential attack) on the faith – as opposed to actual physical attacks on members or 
symbols of the faith. The logical, extreme conclusion is that the mere presence of any 
ideology other than Islam is tantamount to an attack on Islam, or stands as a barrier to the 
dawah (“call” to Islam), and according to Qutb, “must be eradicated first by force that it 
may become possible to address the human heart and mind after being freed from 
chains.”23 It must be noted, however, that Qutb’s feelings on this topic might have been 
greatly affected by his imprisonment and torture at the hands of a more or less secular 
regime. 
By describing jihad as an individual struggle, on par with the struggle for 
devoutness, jihad was moved from the realm of collective duties (fard kifaya). To be 
cynical about it, community responsibilities could be said to be (in the mind of the 
common Muslim) “something my neighbor will take care of.” To make it an individual 
responsibility negates the individual’s ability to say “I’m doing my part” if he is not 
personally engaged in active jihad. The Muslim attitude toward fard kifaya is 
wonderfully illustrated in reactions to the Afghan war: 
It is worth mentioning that a consensus then existed among Muslim clerics 
and scholars that doing jihad against the Russian invaders [in Afghanistan] 
was legitimate (defensive) and could be considered a “collective” duty. 
Leading mainstream religious figures in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, 
and elsewhere issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling on Muslims to join 
their Afghan coreligionists in resisting Russian aggression. Tens of 
thousands of Muslims responded to the jihad call from their religious 
authority. Thousands of radical Islamists and jihadis also migrated to 
Afghanistan to train and prepare for the coming wars against “impious” 
Muslim rulers.24 
 
                                                 
22 Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 80. 
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Note that “tens of thousands” responded, but only “thousands” migrated to Afghanistan. 
Further, those who did migrate were apparently more interested in Afghanistan as a 
“school of hard knocks” from which they could return home and conduct more 
appropriate jihad against local rulers. 
D. EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY 
Core jihadi ideology is unpalatable to most Muslims. Extremist jihadis have 
suffered a failure to appeal to a broad mass of Muslim humanity because of the extreme 
nature of their beliefs – their values are just too far outside the mainstream to become 
widely accepted. Jihadi ideologues favor the strict implementation of sharia law as the 
basis for governance, and they praise Afghanistan (after the installation of the Taliban) as 
a model of Islamic society – even while deriding the Afghans for their lack of adherence 
to the strict Wahhabi branch of Islam. Some of the jihadis’ primary goals include the 
establishment of a caliphate throughout dar al-islam (House of Islam, or Muslim lands) 
that would “make the Shariah the law of the lands;”25 the overthrow of apostate Muslim 
leaders; the removal of Jews from Palestine; and the removal of “crusader armies” from 
the Arabian peninsula. While most Muslims agree in principle with some of the less 
extreme jihadi goals, there is little support or desire for the institution of a backward and 
repressive fundamentalist regime – as in Afghanistan – in their own countries. 
Just as Lenin argued that it was necessary to utilize a highly dedicated “vanguard” 
as the catalyst to revolution, Qutb argued similarly. Qutb believed that “[Western style 
political institutions] continue the myth that the nation is the source of authority. Since 
the nation is made up of ‘millions of emaciated, ignorant, hungry people who toil night 
and day in search of food and who can spare no time in exercising what is called “the 
right to vote” and “freedom of choice,”‘ they follow the bidding of their masters who 
control their source of livelihood.”26 To put a fine point on it, Qutb felt that “The vast 
majority of Muslims are too caught up in and corrupted by the system of unjust and anti-
Islamic rule to know how and when to take up arms against the state.”27 The point that 
everyday Muslims might also take from this is that Qutb felt that most Muslims were too 
                                                 
25 Gerges, The Far Enemy, 44. 
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blinded, stupid, or ignorant to know what was best for them, and needed “enlightened” 
individuals to lead them down the path of righteousness – a typical conceit echoed by 
many so-called revolutionaries. 
The unfortunate reality for jihadis in Muslim nations is that jihad against apostate 
rulers has historically resulted in jail, death, or both. For example, Qutb joined the 
Muslim Brotherhood on his return to Egypt from the United States. He and the 
Brotherhood actively supported COL Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers in their 
revolution, and continued to do so immediately afterward. However, when it became 
obvious that Nasser was intent on establishing a secular state – rather than the Islamic 
state that Qutb advocated – Qutb turned from them and eventually expanded on his 
earlier idea of violent overthrow of apostate rulers, with Nasser as the new target. Of 
course, Nasser took offense and jailed Qutb. Years of prison and torture did little to 
soften Qutb’s stance on apostate rulers, and his writings upon release from prison 
reflected that. Nasser soon jailed him again and, after a summary trial, Qutb was 
condemned to death and quickly hanged.28 Thus he became a martyr for his beliefs, 
gaining further stature even in death.  
The next step in the evolution is nationalist jihad in areas like Palestine and 
Chechnya, which is mostly about land, rather than ideology. And yet, this “property-
oriented” jihad is ideologically legitimized through the application of the concept of 
“waqf,” which is “an inalienable religious endowment in Islam, typically devoting a 
building or plot of land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes.”29 Hamas used a 
novel approach to applying waqf in Palestine, arguing that “all of Palestine is waqf given 
by God for use by Muslims until the Day of Judgment.”30 Robinson tells us that this is 
“innovative in two ways. First, waqf is not endowed by God . . . but by humans. . . 
Second, Hamas conflates waqf with sovereignty. . . Waqf is a private donation, not a 
declaration of sovereignty.”31 Hamas’ brilliance here lies in the implied application of 
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Qutb’s well-known concept of “hakimiyyah,” or the sovereignty of God. For Qutb, “the 
confession of faith reiterated daily by Muslims – that ‘there is no God but God’ – is a 
revolution against human sovereignty of any shape or form . . . There is no governance 
except for God, no legislation but from God, no sovereignty of one [person] over the 
other because all sovereignty belongs to God.”32 Therefore, if a parcel of land is God-
granted waqf, it implies God-granted sovereignty. It is truly a masterstroke to tie ancient 
concepts with new ones, especially those espoused by very popular Muslim writers.  
The next step brings us to transnational jihad, which began in earnest in 
Afghanistan. There was, again, a convergence of concepts in Afghanistan: the infidel 
invader, the mujahedeen brothers requiring assistance, and the willingness of Arab 
leaders to support the jihad (through fatwas from the ulema). In reality, the ulema were 
frequently in bed with the “corrupt leaders,” and could be counted on to offer support in 
political matters. The Afghan mujahedeen were doing well enough, but it didn’t hurt the 
Afghans when Saudi (and other) clerics issued fatwas urging jihad to support them. 
Promoting the jihad in Afghanistan was a matter of sheer practicality. With jihadis off 
fighting (and hopefully dying) in distant lands, they would not be able to cause problems 
for the national leaders back home. 
The Afghan mujahedeen, while not wildly successful against the Russians, were 
“successful enough.” The Russian retreat from Afghanistan seemed to confirm the 
superiority of the Islamic way, and gave ideologues such as bin Laden the opportunity to 
beat the drum of jihadi victory against the “far enemy.” While the success story is 
somewhat true, bin Laden and others of his ilk avoid some inconvenient truths. They 
frequently gloss over or ignore the extensive participation of Western nations, who had 
their own reasons for wanting the Russians out of Afghanistan. They overstate the 
contributions of the relatively small jihadi (non-Afghan) contingent. Many Afghan-Arab 
jihadis spoke Arabic, not Dari or Pashto, and as a result they were consigned to less 
important positions. In fact, they might be referred to in Western parlance as “strap-
hangers” – people merely along for the ride, and of little to no importance. Finally, the 
ideologues tend to minimize the capabilities and accomplishments of the Afghan 
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mujahedeen. With the bulk of the fighting force being local mujahedeen, there really can 
be no question of who “won the war.” Still, all the rhetoric feeds the developing concept 
that jihadis can target the far enemy in order to remove support for apostate local rulers. 
While it is true that Russia could be considered the far enemy in the Afghan conflict, 
mujaheed success there did not result in the removal of support to (and subsequent failure 
of), a local jahili government – another inconvenient truth that is given short shrift by the 
ideologues. 
From jihadi “success” against the Russians in Afghanistan, it was a short 
ideological step to the active targeting of the perceived source of so much of the Muslim 
world’s troubles – the United States. Some time after 9/11, bin Laden boasted that he was 
the “only one in the group’s [al Qaeda] upper heirarchy who had anticipated the 
magnitude of the wound al Qaeda inflicted on America . . . His goal, for at least five 
years, had been to goad America into invading Afghanistan, an ambition that had caused 
him to continually raise the stakes – the simultaneous bombings of the United States 
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in August 1998, followed by the attack on an 
American warship in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000.”33 Apparently, bin 
Laden hoped to accomplish similar goals with the Americans in Afghanistan as had been 
accomplished with the Russians before them. 
Thus, we have a convergence of novel and broadly accepted concepts feeding into 
a new way of thinking about jihad. Jihad is no longer defensive against just physical 
attack, but defensive against the existence of that which is not Islamic. Jihad is no longer 
merely local in nature, as there are Muslims in Islamic states who require the help of the 
“broader umma” in their struggle against both jahili rulers or infidel invaders intent on 
taking Muslim lands. Finally, jihad applies to actions against Western regimes that 
support apostate local rulers. 
E. THE EVOLUTION OF JIHAD THEORY 
After defeating the Russians, returning Afghan War jihadis brought with them a 
broader understanding of the concept of jihad. The evolution seems obvious in retrospect. 
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First, jihadis were unable to muster support for change within the umma – as evidenced 
by the lack of a popular Islamic uprising in most Muslim countries – and so concentrated 
their efforts on the rulers. Failing the overthrow of their jahili governments at home, they 
ventured out to conduct jihad in solidarity with their repressed Muslim brothers in 
Afghanistan (with the encouragement of their national and religious leaders). The Afghan 
War returnees brought home with them the concept of “success” in relation to targeting 
an enemy – success which had previously eluded them in their (Muslim) home countries. 
These factors, among many others, have combined to ease the transition from a purely 
local focus for the jihad to a more transnational view. This transnational focus has led to 
a number of attacks outside the Islamic sphere, perpetrated by transplanted jihadis living 
in the West, and with the goal of removing support to apostate Muslim rulers – concepts 
that were unheard of in earlier times. These high-profile attacks served as the stepping-off 
point for jihadis born and raised in the West to begin conducting their own attacks. Still, 
without everything that had gone before, the high-profile attacks might never have taken 
place. 
Bin Laden (among others) has done his best to popularize the notion of targeting 
the far enemy by playing up the role of “Afghan Arabs” in both Afghanistan and 
Somalia.34 However, not all radical Islamists espouse targeting the far enemy. In fact, 
despite bin Laden’s astounding success in developing and executing 9/11, it appears that 
most jihadis are content to continue targeting the near enemy.35 Further, there is evidence 
that many jihadis view bin Laden’s emphasis on the far enemy to be sheer folly.36 They 
are concerned about the results of targeting an enemy who is so much more powerful 
than the typical apostate Muslim ruler. 
Ultimately, desperation borne of frustration and failure at home (both in 
provoking the umma and in overthrowing the regimes), along with misrepresented 
theories of success in Afghanistan and an amazingly permissive environment in the West, 
have combined to lead some jihadis to adopt the tactic of targeting the far enemy.  
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The Muslim diaspora, combined with an evolved understanding of jihad and other 
key Islamic concepts, set the conditions for attacks perpetrated by jihadis from the West. 
For example, it is now acceptable to conduct jihad everywhere (and this is the extension 
of transnational jihad) because now that Muslims live in a global community (perhaps a 
transnational umma), they have to struggle everywhere.37 It is no longer a question about 
offensive jihad in order to take ground, but rather it is about defensive jihad at any locale 
in response to affronts to the faith by that which is “not Islam.”  
Along with the extensive repackaging of other concepts comes the redefinition of 
acceptable targets. Traditionally, attacks on civilians and various sorts of non-combatants 
have been taboo. Attacks on civilians are now acceptable, according to both Zawahiri and 
bin Laden.38 There exists a consensus (at least between bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their 
adherents) that targeting civilians is acceptable because, according to Zawahiri, “in 
democratic countries the people elect their governments, [so] they become responsible for 
the action of these governments and so effectively lose the protection afforded by civilian 
status.”39 Herein lies the explanation for the evolution of targets from the military (USS 
Cole), to those representative of the enemy state (U.S. embassy bombings), to the 
symbolic (9/11), and finally, to the merely pedestrian, or ordinary civilian targets (Madrid 
transit bombings on March 11, 2004, and London transit bombings on July 7, 2005). 
Additionally, European homogeneity is conducive to “borderless” attacks. To 
many Muslims, Europe is seen not as a colorful assortment of small states, but rather as a 
monolithic entity that makes up a large portion of what they view as “the West,” with the 
rest of the West for the most part being the United States. Especially now, with the 
removal of travel restrictions and the development of a “borderless” Europe, it is easy to 
comprehend the vision of Europe as “one big target.” Unless a jihadi has a specific goal, 
such as forcing the outcome of an election (as in the Madrid transit bombings), one place 
is as good as the next – they’re all the same. 
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Finally, there is a convergence of transnational jihadi thought (instigators) with 
willing local participants, catalyzed by the presence of veteran jihadis from other locales. 
Sometimes the veteran jihadis act as the instigators, but more frequently it is the 
ideologues (who may or may not be veteran jihadis themselves) assuming that role. Many 
of the willing local participants are recruited from among the ranks of second and later 
generation immigrants, many of whom wish for a return to the halcyon days of Islamic 
purity – as though such a thing ever truly existed.  
F. SUMMARY 
Ultimately, it is an amazing convergence of factors which has led to the expansion 
of radical Islam in the West. Some relatively mundane shifts in Islamic philosophy, 
combined with other, more radical shifts, have brought about an overall revolution in 
jihadi ideology. Whether this new ideology has caught on with the Muslim world at large 
is moot – it has caught on with enough of the Muslim world. It is that revolution in 
philosophy, combined with an appropriately permissive atmosphere (as found in the UK, 
for instance) that has led to the dramatic expansion of radical Islam in the West. Until 
now, conditions simply did not exist in which this situation could develop as it has. 
International support to corrupt Muslim leaders, jihadis with a strong sense of success 
against a powerful opponent, a new vision on whom to attack, a revised ideology, and a 
continued (or increased) Western presence in Muslim lands – these are the building 
blocks of Islamic expansion. 
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III. ROOTS OF CULTURAL STRIFE IN BRITAIN / A COUNTRY 
DIVIDED 
A. BRITISH POPULATION 
It would be impossible to address multiculturalism and the related cultural divides 
in the UK without considering the associated social and economic data. The 2004 Draft 
UK Report On Young Muslims, released in April 2004, remains a key source for 
comment and discussion on Muslims living in the UK. This report draws heavily on the 
2001 Census, the 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey, and the 2004 Annual Population 
Survey as the data and statistics used to formulate recommendations to deal with issues of 
race and religion in the UK.  
Several key observations can be made from the Draft Report, and while these 
observations will be highlighted in the following pages, it is important to summarize 
them quickly. First, Muslims (numbering approximately 1.54 million) are the second 
largest religious group in the UK, with at least one million more adherents than the next 
largest group (Hindus, numbering just over 552,000). Christians comprise the largest 
religious group in the UK with more than 37 million followers. It is also important to 
recognize that those stating no religion and those choosing not to state a religion were 
significant populations, consisting of 7.7 million and 4 million people, respectively. The 
total population of the UK as of the 2001 Census was just over 52 million (Figure 1). 
Also in 2001, it was determined that nearly 92% of the population in the UK was white, 
with the remaining 8% comprised of various other ethnic groups. The largest of the 
ethnic groups were Indians, followed by Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, 
and Bangladeshis, respectively.40 (See Figure 1 for the breakdown of religion by ethnic 
group) 
Second, in addition to being the second largest group, Muslims are 
demographically the youngest of all religious groups, with just over 70% of the Muslim 
population being under the age of 34 (Figure 7). 
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Third, Muslims consistently rank among the lowest of all groups in terms of 
social and economic status, including unemployment, education, and living conditions. 
Muslim households are also among the largest in terms of both immediate family and 
multiple families dwelling in the same accommodations. 
Fourth, Muslims rate amongst the highest of all the minority groups, specifically 
in consideration of their status as the second largest religious population, where the 
question of religion relates to personal identity and where nationality is much less 
relevant. 
B. RELIGION 
As stated, Christians are clearly the largest religious group in the UK. Further, 
while Muslims comprise the second largest, there are two other significant groups in the 
religious spectrum whose numbers, while less than Christians, exceed those of Muslims. 
These intermediary groups are those claiming “no religion” (7.7 million) and those 
choosing not to state their religion (just over 4 million). The total numbers for population 




Figure 1.   Religion by Ethnic Group, England and Wales – Percentage of Base (After 
Ref 2001 Census, UK)41 







     Base   (in 
millions)
White 96.33 38.79 1.31 96.81 11.62 2.09 78.41 94.54 90.89 91.31 47.52
  British 92.60 34.90 1.05 83.99 4.08 1.88 72.23 91.23 86.55 87.49 45.53
  Irish 1.47 0.83 0.03 0.44 0.06 0.05 1.10 0.53 1.19 1.23 0.642
  Other White 2.26 3.07 0.23 12.37 7.49 0.17 5.08 2.78 3.15 2.59 1.35
Mixed 0.93 3.22 1.04 1.19 4.15 0.84 2.54 1.99 1.90 1.27 0.661
  White/Black/    
Caribbean 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.59 0.78 0.74 0.46 0.237
  White/Black      
African 0.12 0.32 0.03 0.07 0.68 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.079
  White/Asian 0.22 1.28 0.64 0.32 1.97 0.64 0.85 0.59 0.51 0.36 0.189
  Other Mixed 0.20 1.26 0.34 0.66 1.42 0.17 0.92 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.156
Asian or Asian 
British 0.25 9.64 96.56 0.72 73.65 96.18 13.73 0.40 3.11 4.37 2.27
  Indian 0.14 1.30 84.46 0.26 8.51 91.48 12.03 0.23 1.20 1.99 1.04
  Pakistani 0.02 0.13 0.10 0.14 42.52 0.11 0.20 0.05 1.10 1.37 0.715
  Bangladeshi 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.05 16.79 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.41 0.54 0.281
  Other Asian 0.09 8.09 11.69 0.28 5.82 4.56 1.48 0.11 0.41 0.46 0.241
Black or Black 
British 2.17 1.04 0.54 0.35 6.88 0.19 3.28 1.12 3.14 2.19 1.14
  Black               
Caribbean 1.11 0.67 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.04 2.19 0.82 1.83 1.08 0.564
  Black                
African 0.88 0.24 0.18 0.09 6.22 0.12 0.68 0.14 0.97 0.92 0.479
  Other Black 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.37 0.02 0.42 0.15 0.33 0.18 0.096
Chinese/Other 0.33 47.31 0.55 0.92 3.70 0.71 2.04 1.95 0.96 0.86 0.447
  Chinese 0.13 23.75 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.73 1.55 0.55 0.44 0.227
  Other Ethnic    
Group 0.19 23.56 0.53 0.88 3.65 0.68 1.31 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.219
All People 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 52.04
Base (in millions) 37.34 0.144 0.552 0.259 1.55 0.329 0.151 7.71 4.01 52.04
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C. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
The 2001 Census reported that, on the whole, individuals from non-Christian 
religions were more likely to live in England than either Scotland or Wales. Overall, non-
Christians comprised 6% of the population of England, while only 2% of the Welsh and 
1% of the Scottish populations were non-Christian.42 
As stated, the second largest religious group in the UK was Muslims. Of this 
population, approximately 77% were concentrated around four regions. These regions 
were London (38%), West Midlands (14%), the North West 13%, and Yorkshire and the 
Humber (12%). 
As a whole, non-Christian groups, including Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Muslims, tended to be concentrated in London or other large urban areas, while 
Christians and those stating no religion tended to be spread throughout the less urban or 
more rural areas. Proportionally, London possessed the lowest population of Christians. 
While 71% of the entire UK population claims to be Christian (Figure 1), only 58% of 
the London population identify themselves as Christian.43 As a greater whole, this 58% 
comprises only 10% of the entire Christian population in the UK. As the discussion of the 
Christian population points out, when viewing Figure 2, it is significant to note, 
percentages represent the portion of each religious group living in London and does not 
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Within London, there were clear lines in relation to locality between all religious 
groups, but these divisions were starkly evident between the two largest religious 
populations: Christian and Muslim. 
 
Figure 3.   Christians in London45 
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Figure 4.   Muslims in London46 
 
Population clusters concerning these two religious groups in particular become 
increasingly relevant as we consider employment statistics and living conditions in these 
areas later in this chapter. 
D. COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
National identity appears to play a role in one’s propensity to to conduct attacks 
on one’s own country. Nearly 70% of Muslims surveyed described their national identity 
as British, English, Scottish, or Welsh. Only Hindus and Buddhists were less likely than 
Muslims to describe their national identity as “from the UK.” Christians, Jews, and those 
stating “no religion” were the most likely to describe themselves as having an identity 
from the UK.47 While only 70%, this left Muslims as the third least likely religious group 
to identify themselves with their nationality versus their religion. It is also significant to 
remember that Hindus represented the third smallest religion – Muslims outnumbered 
them by nearly one million. Also, Buddhists represented the smallest religious group 
identified by the survey and Muslims outnumbered them by more than one and a quarter 
million. 
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In every religious group, individuals born inside the UK were more likely to 
possess a national identity than those born outside the UK. In the case of Jews, 
Christians, and individuals identifying with “no religion,” 99% claimed a national 
identity. In the case of other religious groups, 93% of Buddhists and Sikhs, 91% of 
Muslims, and 89% of Hindus born inside the UK claimed a national identity.49 Once 
again, Muslims were one of the least likely groups to identify themselves as British and 
were more likely to describe themselves as Muslim. 
E. COUNTRY OF BIRTH 
Of the Muslims surveyed in 2001, only 46% had been born in the UK. The 
remaining Muslims surveyed had been born in Asia, Africa, or Europe. Hindus were the 
least likely of all religious groups to be born in the UK, with only 37% born in the 
country. Buddhists were immediately behind Muslims, with 45% of their population 
being born inside the UK.50 
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Figure 6.   Muslims Living in the UK, Country of Birth (After Ref Office for 
National Statistics)51 
Place of Birth Region Country
Europe 50
  United Kingdom 46
  Turkey 3
  Yugoslavia 1
Asia 39
  Pakistan 18
  Bangledesh 9
  India 3
Africa 9
  Somalia 2
  Kenya 1
 
F. AGE AND GENDER 
Of all the religious groups, Muslims had the youngest age profile and were the 
only group where men outnumbered women. When the census was conducted in 2001, 
approximately 34% of Muslims were under the age of 16 and just over 70% were under 
the age of 34, while less than 10% were over the age of 65. Men outnumbered women by 
52 to 48% of the total Muslim population. The surveyors attributed the young age and the 
disproportionate representation of men to women to the group’s immigration history and 
the gender structures of the Indian and Bangladeshi communities.52 The immigration 
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Before discussing education statistics in the UK, it is important to have at least a 
general understanding of how achievement is measured there. The British education 
system measures the ability or employability of individuals in relation to the 
qualifications they possess. These qualifications are generally broken down into three 
categories: academic, vocational, and skill based.54 Within this system there are nine 
levels of qualifications, including the basic entry level.  
The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is the primary 
qualification achieved by youth aged 14-16.55 Children in the UK are required to attend 
school until the age of 16, by which time individual students have typically completed 
their GCSE courses and accompanying exams. Once completed, the GCSE results 
determine an individual’s potential for staying in school to attend Advanced Level (A 
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Level) courses. This applies in cases of those desiring to attend a University or vocational 
school. For those who do not desire to attend either a University or vocational school, 
GCSEs can still be critical as many employers desire at least some level of competency in 
the skills the GCSE evaluates. It is not legally possible for students to leave school prior 
to age 16 and thus, at least attempting GCSE courses and exams. However, the statistics 
discussed below clearly show a significant number of students are slipping through the 
cracks and leaving school early with no measurable qualifications whatsoever. In defense 
of the UK, this shortcoming is common in many countries including the United States. 
What is significant to this discussion, specifically, is the high percentage of Muslim 
youth who are not completing their education and therefore not gaining necessary GCSE 
qualifications. 
In 2004, Muslims of working age were the least likely of all groups to have any 
qualifications (33%) and were also the least likely to have degrees or some other 
equivalent qualification.56 Still, Muslims born in the UK were more likely to have 
degrees or equivalent qualifications than Muslims born outside the UK. Specifically, 
Muslims under 30 and born in the UK were nearly twice as likely to have degrees as 
those born outside the UK. However, the number of Muslims possessing degrees was still 
significantly lower than that of other minority groups.57 
In 2004, there were 371,000 school-age Muslim children between 5 and 16 years 
of age. Of the nearly 7,000 state-maintained faith schools in England, 99% were 
Christian, capable of handling 1.7 of the 5.1 million Christian children; four were 
Muslim, capable of handling 1,100 children; two were Sikh, capable of handling around 
600 of the total 64,000 Sikh children; finally, Jewish schools were capable of handling 
13,000 of the 33,000 Jewish children.58 Data was not discovered providing the number of 
private faith based schools available. Yet it is significant to note that state funding is 
provided to support 33% of the Christian school-aged population, but only .2% of the 
Muslim school-aged population. Once again, Muslims, the second largest religious group, 
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comprise nearly 3% of the total UK population (Figure 1). This is a statistically small 
amount spent on one of the most significantly underperforming populations. The 
potential ramifications become more significant when one considers the overall youth of 
the Muslim population (Figure 7) and the Muslim population’s relative family size, as 
will be discussed shortly. Finally, one shortcoming of this data is that it does not account 
for Muslim youth who attend non-faith-based public schools. 
H. ECONOMIC STATUS 
The 2001 census found that Muslim households were the largest in Britain with 
an average size of 3.8 people. Additionally, 34% of Muslim households were likely to 
include more than five people. Sixty-three percent of Muslim households included at 
least one dependent child with 25% containing three or more. In comparison, percentages 
of Sikh, Hindu, and Christian households containing three or more dependent children 
were fourteen, seven, and five, respectively. The larger households were attributed to the 
younger age of the Muslim population and the intentions of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women to have more children than Indian and White women. Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis respectively make up 42.5% and 16.7% of the total Muslim population 
(59% combined) (Figure 1). By ethnicity, the average intended number of children for 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women was 3.4 and 3.6 respectively, while the average 
intended number of children for Indian and White women was 2.4 and 2.1, respectively.59 
In 2001, multiple family households comprised 7% of all the households in 
Britain. In the Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu populations, multiple family households made up 
between 19% and 21% of all the households. These households were likely to be 
comprised of a single extended family.60  
Additionally, 32% of Muslim households were considered to be living in 
overcrowded accommodations, the highest average of any groups surveyed. Muslim 
households were also the most likely to lack central heating as well as sole access to a 
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bathroom per apartment or accomodation61 (commonly known in the U.S. as “single-
family dwellings”). Further, the London Health Commission published 2002 data 
showing the percentage of unfit dwellings by borough in London. When comparing the 
map shown in Figure 8 with the map shown in Figure 4, there is significant correlation 
between the predominantly Muslim areas and the percentage of unfit dwellings. 
 




The 2001 data showed that Muslims and Buddhists were the least likely of all 
groups to own their own homes, with only 52% and 54%, respectively, owning the house 
they lived in. In addition, 28% of all Muslim households were living in social rented 
housing.63 Social rented housing in the UK is equivalent to low income housing in the 
United States. 
I. UNEMPLOYMENT 
In 2004, it was reported that both Muslim men and women held the highest rates 
of unemployment, with 13% and 18%, respectively. These rates were three times the 
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unemployment rates of Christian men (4%) and nearly twice the unemployment rate of 
the next closest non-Christian group. For women, the rate was nearly four times the rate 
of unemployment for Christian and Jewish women and was double the rate of the next 
closest non-Christian group.64 
 
Figure 9.   Unemployment Rates by Religion and Sex, 200465 
 
 
While unemployment rates in all religious groups were highest among those 
individuals under 25 years of age, Muslims in the age group of 16-24 were the most 
likely of all groups to be unemployed and more than twice as likely as Christians in the 
same age group to be unemployed.66 This is particularly significant, as depicted in Figure 
7, as this age group represented a major portion of the Muslim under 34 age group, which 
comprised somewhere around 70% of the total Muslim population. 
While Muslim males over 25 were more likely than Muslim males under 25 to be 
employed, their rate of unemployment was still three times that of Christians in the same 
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age group, with an 11% versus a 3% unemployment rate in this age bracket.67 Once 
again, Muslims under 34 represented the majority of the Muslim population in the UK. 
Muslim men and women of all age groups were more likely to be economically 
inactive, meaning they were unavailable to work or not seeking work due to being a 
student, being disabled, or caring for family or a household. Among Muslim men of 
working age, 31% were economically inactive, versus 16% of Christian men. The survey 
explains this was partially due to the high number of Muslim men who were students, but 
also points out that among older men of working age, Muslim men maintained a higher 
level of economic inactivity at least partially due to poor health.68 The study does not 
describe whether the poor health is due to living conditions. However, as depicted in 
Figure 8, living conditions in Muslim areas were among the worst in London. The survey 
also does not explain the disparity between the number of Muslim men claiming to be 
students versus the low number of Muslims achieving degrees and qualifications as 
discussed earlier in the education section. 
Women in every religious group were more likely than men to be economically 
inactive, but once again Muslim women were the most likely of all groups to be inactive. 
The rate of economic inactivity among Muslim women was 69%, as compared to around 
40% in the next highest age group. Of all the religious groups surveyed, Christian women 
were the least likely to be economically inactive, at a rate of 25%.69 
Included in the 2004 London Health Commissions report were the “by ward” 
unemployment percentages. Once again, when compared to the Muslim populated areas 
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J. SUMMARY  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Muslims, while the second largest 
religious group, consistently rank as one of the lowest segments of the population in 
socio-economic status and educational achievement. These factors, combined with the 
exceptionally young age of the Muslim population, manifest themselves as several unique 
variables that do not seem to have effected or influenced other smaller religious 
populations. In his December 2006 speech, Prime Minister Blair made the following 
statement: 
The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a 
celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to allow people 
to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their 
difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were 
those of solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right 
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to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by 
a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British 
and black, British and white.71 
While the vision of a multi-cultural Britain may have been one of harmony and 
unity, the data just described paint a very different picture. It is a picture that shows clear 
racial and ethnic lines of separation. Subsequently, as ethnicity clearly relates to and is 
intertwined with religion (Figure 1), it follows that there is a religious line of separation 
as well. Subsequent chapters will address issues of multiculturalism and isolation of the 
Muslim population from the greater British population. During these discussions it is 
critical to keep in mind the current state of Muslims in the UK as well as the role that 
policies such as multiculturalism have played in creating the situations outlined in the 
previous discussion. 
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IV. MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM  
A. WHY MULTICULTURALISM? 
The purpose of terrorist activity is to cause fear in the population of a given 
society so as to achieve a desired political outcome. Threats of violence from outside 
group are generally greeted with less of a sense of surprise, as opposed to attacks on a 
group by its own members. Internal threats bring about a sense of betrayal and lack of 
control, whereas external threats, while not welcomed, are certainly more expected. As a 
result, the level of fear inflicted is increased significantly when the threat of attack comes 
from individuals within a society. Consider the actions of British police on July 22, 2005, 
following the failed bombings just the day prior. The failed July 21 attempt by 
individuals who were suspected of being British citizens, coming on the heels of the 
successful attacks by British citizens exactly two weeks prior, created a sense of fear and 
confusion throughout the UK. On July 22, 2005, London police (who, with the exception 
of specific situations, are normally unarmed) shot dead 27-year-old Brazilian, Jean 
Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell Underground tube station in front of horrified 
onlookers. The shooting itself summarizes the fear and confusion following the two 
recent subway attacks. The police pinned Menezes to his seat and fired multiple point 
blank shots into his head and torso, in fear that he had a bomb under his unusually baggy 
coat, which they had identified as an oddity for a warm July day. Multiple explanations 
were given as to why or how police were able to make such a tragic decision, but in the 
end it was disastrously clear that Jean Charles de Menezes was no terrorist and had no 
connection with either of the previous attacks. 
In the case of 9/11 in the U.S.A., all 19 of the individuals carrying out these 
attacks were of Middle East descent, from areas with a well-established dislike for the 
West. Other significant attacks prior to 9/11, including the 1993 World Trade Center 
Bombing, the USS Cole bombing, and bombings at two US Embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya in August 1998, were similarly planned and executed by individuals born and 
raised in the Middle East, Africa, or other non-Western countries. 
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However, the extremist methodology seemed to shift with the successful attacks 
on the London mass transit system by British citizens on July 7, 2005. Subsequent attacks 
conducted later in July were unsuccessful, but were again attempted by primarily British 
citizens with both single and dual citizenship. Yet another attempt was the unsuccessful 
plan to destroy as many as a dozen intercontinental flights in August of 2006 – once 
again by predominantly British Muslims. What has brought about this change in the 
national origin of recent terrorists? It is our contention that a British policy of 
multiculturalism is one of the key contributing factors enabling the actions of a new 
generation of “homegrown” jihadis. This is supported by Home Office data suggesting 
increasing numbers of British Muslims see themselves as Muslims first and British 
second – if at all – as they are no longer required to view themselves as Britons, or even 
British Muslims, but rather are encouraged to view themselves as Muslims who live in 
Britain. 
B. MULTICULTURALISM DEFINED 
Precise and agreed-upon definitions of exactly what multiculturalism is and what 
it is intended to achieve are almost as numerous as are the number of supporters and 
detractors. The word seems many times to have a different meaning for everyone, and on 
its web site the UK’s Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), established in 1976 under 
the Race Relations Act, freely admits this.72 For this reason, this thesis utilizes the 
following definition as the initial basis for discussion: multiculturalism is “the practice of 
giving equal emphasis to the needs and contributions of all cultural groups, esp. 
traditionally underrepresented minority groups, in a society.”73 
In his December 2006 speech on multicultural Britain, Prime Minister Blair 
provides the British perspective on this definition, also addressing the need to approach 
the issues of integration and multiculturalism as two clearly distinct but related issues: 
Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about 
values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying 
British values. It isn’t about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the 
rights and duties that go with being a member of our society. 
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Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect 
right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to 
conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is 
about. That is what is legitimately distinctive. 
But when it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule 
of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its 
shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold 
in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that 
point no distinctive culture or religion supercedes our duty to be part of an 
integrated United Kingdom.74 
Given this perspective, the CRE expresses the benefits of pursuing a policy of 
integration over multiculturalism, given the Commission’s grievances with the policy of 
multiculturalism as follows:  
The reinforcement of a particular group identity is emphasised at the 
expense of the common identity that comes from a consciousness of 
membership of the wider society. 
The belief that all cultures are of equal value and must be publicly 
recognised as such, and that wider society should accommodate other 
cultures and beliefs without expecting any reciprocation. 
The concept of a group is closed and ‘essentialist’: groups are defined by 
adherence to cultural traditions or definitions of ethnicity that are assumed 
to be unchanging (even if these are disputed within or among groups). 
Policy and decisions governing public expenditure are based on 
assumptions that the interests of members of a particular group are defined 
more by their membership of that group than by any other factor, and that 
group organisations act as representatives of the interests of members of a 
particular community, even when they lack any democratic mandate. 
Greater emphasis is given to representation through identity-specific 
community organisations or identity-based political activity than to 
ensuring participation by members of minority groups in the common 
democratic and decision-making structures of the wider society.75 
The basis for the desire for multiculturalism can be difficult to ascertain, but the 
basis for it in present-day England appears to stem from a desire to not insult immigrants 
by requiring them to “become British.” Rather, they are allowed to retain a large majority 
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of aspects of their culture as they existed prior to immigration. This results in a political 
condition that can be broadly described as “multiculturalism.” Well-meaning and 
generous, to be sure, but not the foundation for harmonious inter-cultural relations. In her 
book Londonistan, Melanie Phillips describes multiculturalism in the UK: 
Where previous ties of obligation had bound individuals to each other and 
to the state, the new culture of entitlement imposed instead an obligation 
on the state to deliver individual demands that were presented as rights. 
Since radical egalitarianism meant that all lifestyles were of equal value, 
the very notion of a majority culture or normative rules of behaviour 
became suspect as innately exclusive, prejudiced or oppressive. Moral 
judgments between different lifestyles or behavior became discrimination; 
and prejudice, the term for discrimination between lifestyles, became the 
sin that obviated the moral codes at the heart of Judaism and Christianity, 
which had formed the bedrock of Western civilization.76 
To be unabashedly parochial about it, the success of British culture provides the 
foundation and impetus for the successful immigration of people of any other culture to 
the UK, so British culture deserves the biggest seat at the table. As the Prime Minister 
states above, “It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British 
values.”77 In this instance, all cultures do not come equally to the table, and to assume 
that they do is to delegitimize the power and stability provided by a central marker – 
almost guaranteeing the “rule” of chaos. This situation is commonly known in 
anthropology as “cultural relativism.” Keesing describes cultural relativism as “. . . a 
viewpoint which looks at standards of behavior as relative to each cultural tradition. The 
values expressed in any culture, the relativist says, are to be both understood and valued 
only according to how the people concerned set up their view of life [emphasis 
original].”78 Cultural relativism is an excellent tool for anthropologists conducting a 
detailed academic study. However, when put into practice on a societal level, it provides 
the basis for cultural strife. Cultural relativism, or multiculturalism, is meant for use as a 
tool to assess aspects of a culture – while maintaining that culture as an object apart from 
any other. Attempting to “level” cultures against each other is then sheer folly, as  
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members of any one culture will never assess any other culture to be a match for their 
own – whether the assessment is based on the most miniscule difference or the most lofty 
cultural ideal. 
The generous welcome from liberal Western democracies who want to receive 
oppressed peoples, but not offend them through forced assimilation into their host 
country’s native culture, offers the jihadis a taste of the political means they can use to 
achieve their goals – by using the almost excessive freedoms available in the democratic 
system to push their own agenda. As Harris states: 
Throughout Europe, Muslim communities often show little inclination to 
acquire the secular and civil values of their host countries, and yet they 
exploit these values to the utmost, demanding tolerance for their 
misogyny, their anti-Semitism, and the religious hatred that is regularly 
preached in their mosques.79 
Many Muslims have moved into permissive Western societies that have adopted an 
overeager application of multiculturalism. Unfortunately, while the local government 
seems willing to accept Muslim immigrants at face value, the same cannot always be said 
of the immigrants, who sometimes find the cultural differences almost too much to bear. 
This is especially true of those Muslim immigrants with more extreme beliefs. As 
expected, Muslims in the West today have experiences similar to Qutb’s during his visit 
to America, and they (especially those of extreme ideology) recoil from it. Extremists 
view what they see as the West’s moral decay as an attack on Islam, and thus find an 
excuse to justify the conduct of contrived, defensive attacks against the West (as 
described in Chapter I). The disdain that many Muslim immigrants have for their adopted 
society has resulted in self-imposed segregation from (but within) that society. They 
dislike their new surroundings, but not enough to return to their previous surroundings. 
The cultural and religious isolation of European Muslims has resulted in large 
swathes of the European landscape being redefined as Islamic enclaves. Additionally, 
multiple generations of Muslims have now grown up in Europe. They have, as have so 
many other immigrant groups, managed to carve out a “society within a society”. This is 
not unprecedented: Jews in the UK have established cultural centers, and even have their 
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own legal system for civil matters, which mirrors the official legal system. Recently, 
Muslims in the UK have begun applying sharia to civil cases as well.80  
Many Western societies gladly welcome new members through immigration, so 
long as the new members conform to the expectations outlined by the societies‘ legal 
codes. Typically, these new members are expected to conduct themselves in accordance 
with established social customs of their adopted land – the “when in Rome” concept. 
However, one must understand that at all times, culture is evolving as a result of both 
internal and external influences. The immigrants may not ever fully assimilate, so their 
understanding of what the “Romans” are doing – and why they should do it too – is, at 
some level, going to affect what the “Romans” are doing. Further, long time residents 
(through multiple generations) will frequently lose the original intent of certain aspects of 
their imported ancestral culture. Of course, this is a vastly oversimplified description of 
cultural evolution, but it remains valid. Problems arise between locals and immigrants 
when locals, in the interests of multiculturalism, allow immigrants the wholesale 
retention of their foreign culture, rather than requiring some degree of assimilation on the 
part of the newcomers. In that case, the locals run the risk of having their own culture laid 
aside in favor of whatever else comes along. The use of the word “risk” presupposes that 
the locals attribute some value to their own culture, and do not wish to see it usurped by 
newcomers. Chalmers Johnson discusses this in his book, Revolutionary Change, when 
he enumerates four conditions, “any one of which if realized would terminate a social 
system. These four conditions are . . . biological extinction . . . apathy . . . war of all 
against all . . . absorption of the society into another society.81 While biological 
extinction and war of all against all are unlikely in cases of cultural mingling as a result 
of immigration, one can make an argument that willing acceptance of multiculturalism is 
a substantial manifestation of cultural apathy. Unwillingness to care about or strive on 
behalf of one’s own culture can then result in its subordination or absorption by another 
culture. Johnson doesn’t require that the target culture be absorbed by external forces, nor 
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does he suggest it could occur from the inside. In a case where the target culture actively 
engages in undermining its own relevance, it would hardly seem to matter. 
It is also important to recognize that as a former colonial power, Britain in many 
ways either was or felt it was obligated to accept immigrants from its former colonies as 
many of these individuals were for all practical purposes legally already British. While on 
its surface, a policy of multiculturalism may seem the ideal method of achieving an 
integrated and enlightened Western democratic society, this methodology presents 
serious questions and issues. These questions and issues range from: displays of religious 
and cultural identity such as dress and prayer that may affect schools and places of 
employment, participation in the political process and methods of displaying political 
disagreement or discontent, and even the application of common law. Some of these 
issues are easily remedied through tolerance and acceptance, but others require 
significant consideration and may in fact challenge the very core of Western democracy 
by providing special status and conflicting standards to one religious or ethnic group in 
an attempt to provide equality to all. 
Once again, in his December 2006 speech, Prime Minister Blair addressed this 
issue specifically, stating the following: 
. . . we must demand allegiance to the rule of law. Nobody can 
legitimately ask to stand outside the law of the nation. There is thus no 
question of the UK allowing the introduction of religious law in the UK. 
Parliament sets the law, interpreted by the courts. All criminal matters 
should be dealt with through the criminal justice system. There may be 
areas where, in civil proceedings, parties consent to arbitration by a 
religious body. But these are arrangements based on consent and, in all 
cases, parties will have recourse to the UK courts.82 
The Prime Minister’s statement seems entirely reasonable and fair: accommodating and 
even embracing towards the minority culture by allowing their handling of certain, lesser, 
civil proceedings. On deeper inspection, however, this strategy fails to recognize the 
fundamental differences in the approach of the two sides on this issue. The Prime 
Minister and the British government approach the issue of application and law from the 
Westphalian model, which prizes the sovereignty of the state within its borders and does 
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not recognize outside influence in these matters. The Islamic argument, on the other 
hand, once again views no separation between religion and the government. As already 
discussed, Islam in its true form is as much a religion as it is a form of government – 
where the sovereign himself is subordinate to the religious leadership. This is the 
interpretation of the Muslim extremists calling for sharia law or the return to a true or 
pure Islam. 
Furthermore, a possibly even more significant, the Western distinction between 
civil and criminal law does not exist in Islamic law. In fact, actions that most Western 
countries would address with civil penalties – if they cared to address them at all – carry 
a much harsher penalty under sharia – to include dismemberment and even death. This is 
not to suggest religious courts would begin applying these extreme punishments under 
religious law. Rather, this highlights that it is impossible to argue that it is permissible to 
allow the application of religious laws in lesser civil situations when the religious 
community does not recognize a difference between civil and criminal law. From the 
zealot’s point of view, a victory in one situation is a step towards victory overall and 
therefore justifies the application of religious law in every situation. Also from the 
zealot’s point of view, this is a battle that has been and will continue to be waged over 
hundreds or even thousands of years. 
C. INTEGRATION OF CULTURES INTO BRITISH SOCIETY 
What does Britain require of new immigrants? Very little other than payment for 
a visa. The entry procedures in the 1990s were “lax and sloppy . . . [the system] instead 
showered newcomers with a galaxy of welfare benefits, free education and free health 
care regardless of their behavior, beliefs or circumstances.”83 The judicial system does its 
part to fan the flames by refusing (for the most part) to authorize the extradition of  
known terrorists.84 
Once again, the British Prime Minister’s own words seem entirely welcoming to 
immigrants and do in fact mention the concept of integration: 
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If you come here lawfully, we welcome you. If you are permitted to stay 
here permanently, you become an equal member of our community and 
become one of us. Then you, and all of us, who want to, can worship God 
in our own way, take pride in our different cultures after our own fashion, 
respect our distinctive histories according to our own traditions; but do so 
within a shared space of shared values in which we take no less pride and 
show no less respect. The right to be different. The duty to integrate. That 
is what being British means. And neither racists nor extremists should be 
allowed to destroy it.85 
However, in practice, this concept has proven much more difficult to implement. Any 
more, there no longer seems to be a question of “integration” of immigrants into British 
culture, but rather it appears now that British citizens are expected to integrate immigrant 
cultures into their own. This is best illustrated through a couple of examples from the 
realm of education: 
In the early 1980s, Ray Honeyford, a Bradford headmaster . . . protested 
Bradford council’s policy of educating ethnic minority children according 
to their own culture, predicting that the move would create divisions 
between white and Asian communities. Concerned that “we were getting 
nine-year-olds who had never sat in the same class as a white child,” 
Honeyford wanted to teach English as a first language and teach the 
history, culture and customs of this country [Britain], so that children of 
all cultures and creeds could identify with and participate in the society of 
which they were part. He was accused of racial prejudice and hounded out 
of education . . . He wrote later that he was told he had been forced out 
because his attitudes were “racist” and his insistence on integrating Asian 
children was “dangerous and damaging.”86 
 
Sometime later, a group of parents in Dewsbury, Yorkshire, had the following 
experience: 
In 1987 . . . parents of twenty-six white children refused to send them to 
an overwhelmingly Muslim state-run primary school, and taught them 
instead in a room above a public house. 
The parents did this because they wanted their children to be given 
Christian education, to be taught to a high standard especially in English, 
and to avoid what they saw as prejudice by teachers who were thought to 
be privileging Asian and Muslim culture. The school . . . pursued instead 
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the “multifaith” approach in accordance with government policy . . . that 
schools should educate children in the values shared between cultures and 
to appreciate cultural diversity.87 
As these two examples clearly show, the notion of immigrant integration is a 
concept that has been in serious trouble in the UK for some time now. While the goal of 
minority inclusion is unquestionably desirable, doing it at the expense of the majority is 
inappropriate. Integration is not “zero sum” – unbiased acceptance of difference requires 
nothing more than respect, and there is no need to undermine, denigrate, or disregard one 
culture in order to make room for another. 
A recent report from the BBC discusses the expansion of legal pluralism in the 
UK. According to the article, the Jewish Beth Din civil court has been active for some 
time, and both it and an Islamic tribunal hear civil cases, while a Somali court also hears 
criminal cases. In most instances, the official police and court systems are happy for the 
help, as they are typically overburdened. The article goes on to state some academic 
lawyers see these alternative legal systems as an inevitable – and welcome – consequence 
of multiculturalism.88  
What is not stated is that such a permissive policy of minority self-policing could 
serve to undermine official British institutions. These unofficial courts may provide some 
relief to an overburdened British court system in the short term, but could ultimately lead 
to an inability of the British government to take action in cases where it desperately needs 
to. As the article states: 
The [unofficial] court cannot force anyone to come within its jurisdiction. 
But once someone agrees to settle a dispute in the Beth Din, he or she is 
bound in English law to abide by the court’s decision.  
This is because under English law people may devise their own way to 
settle a dispute before an agreed third party.  
Crucially, the legislation does not insist that settlements must be based on 
English law; all that matters is the outcome is reasonable and both parties 
agree to the process.89  
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Some people have misgivings about the courts, as expressed by Cassandra 
Balchin, a convert to Islam and spokeswoman for the group Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws, who says “Very often traditional forms of mediation can disadvantage 
vulnerable groups, such as women, within a community. I’m concerned about how much 
choice the weaker party would have in submitting to the governance of these alternative 
forums.”90 This is a valid concern when dealing with a culture that, by most modern 
standards of behavior, remains decidedly backward in its treatment of women and 
minorities. 
D. HISTORICAL ISSUES 
From a recent historical perspective, the immigration of Muslims to the UK began 
in the 1950s and never stopped. The peak of this migration was in the early 1970s, with 
some decrease around the 1973 energy crisis, following increased immigration 
restrictions intended to protect British jobs. While the restrictions have consistently 
become stricter, they have in no way halted immigration. Traditionally, the majority of 
immigrants coming to the UK were male industrial workers with the intent to return 
home. However, as a result of increasing restrictions, many of these individuals opted to 
remain for fear they would not be able to return to the UK if they did return home. As a 
result of so many male immigrants remaining in the UK, Britain implemented “family 
reunion” policies, allowing specific family members who had not immigrated to join their 
families in the UK, further increasing the immigrant population.  Additional reasons for 
the increasing populations include the trend for European countries to grant citizenship 
based on the individual’s place of birth (jus soli) versus the parent’s country of 
citizenship (jus sanguinis).91 Linked to this issue is the significantly higher birth rate in 
immigrant communities, as discussed previously in Chapter III. 
The UK transitioned from a policy of jus soli to a policy of jus sanguinis 
following the British Nationality Act of 1981. The act significantly reduced the number 
of individuals eligible to claim citizenship. Under the act, individuals could claim 
citizenship if either: the individual was married to a UK national for three years; the 
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individual was born in the UK to parents who were permanent residents and lived in the 
UK for his first ten years.92 However, other loopholes in the policy still allow a 
significant number of children born to non-citizen parents to gain citizenship. 
E. HISTORICAL VIOLENCE 
Just as the 1950s, 60s, and 70s witnessed racial violence in the United States, the 
period from the 1970s, 80s, 90s and, as with other countries in Europe, even into 2005 
and 2006, has seen racial tension in the UK. While race may have only been one factor 
among many, there have been a number of riots clearly involving racial issues. In many 
cases, race was the significant motivator in a series of riots taking place since the late 70s, 
building through the 80s and 90s, and continuing into the current decade.  
 
Figure 11.   Instances of Racially Motivated Violence 
 
1970s August 1976 – Notting Hill Carnival Riot 
April 1979 – Southall Riots 
1980s April 1980 – St. Pauls Riots in Bristol 
April 1981 – Brixton Riot 
July 1981 – Toxteth Riots 
July 1981 – Handsworth Riots 
September 1985 – Handsworth Riots 
September 1985 – Brixton Riot 
October 1985 – Broadwater Farm Riot 
June 1989 – Dewsbury Riot 
1990s June 1995 – Manningham Riot 
December 1995 – Brixton Riot in December 
2000s May 2001 – Oldham Riots 
July 2001 – Bradford 
October 2005 – Birmingham Riots 
 
All of these riots were related to race, involving either the Black or Asian 
communities, if not both. In fact, the majority of the riots did involve members from both 
communities. This is both significant and understandable as Black and Asian 
communities in the UK are not the same as Black and Asian communities in the United 
States. As depicted in Figure 1, the Black community in the UK is comprised 
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predominantly of individuals of African and Caribbean descent, while the Asian 
community is comprised of individuals from predominantly Indian, Pakistani, and 
Bangladeshi descent. The majority of these riots were centered in or around London, in 
ethnically isolated areas, many of which were in or near the densely populated areas 
depicted in Figure 4 (Muslims in London). 
F. WHY ISLAM, AND WHY NOW? 
While there have been historical challenges to the authority of the British 
government, they can arguably be said to have existed in a vacuum. In fact, the “never 
again” reaction to the racial violence of the past is the likely source of so much of the 
present-day multicultural bias. In a desperate attempt to avoid replays, Britons have 
rejected assimilation and instead gone to the other extreme of absolute accomodation. 
Present-day Muslim extremists have thus found a more permissive environment in which 
to operate. In some respects, the British government has handed radical Islamists the 
“keys to the city.” 
Along with the more permissive environment that democracy provides as 
compared with the more oppressive or watchful environments found in the Middle East, 
extremists are able to hide behind the shields of multiculturalism and discrimination in 
order to gradually gain additional maneuver space for their cause. In many cases, 
protection for their right to exist, operate, and recruit is being provided by the very 
government they oppose. While the traditional misconception of the poor and 
underprivileged being recruited by extremists may finally be finding some truth, as 
evidenced by the clear social and economic disparity that exists, minority groups from all 
social classes in the West are able to find something in the emerging Islam in Western 
cities. As Roy states, “What is at stake is more the reconstruction or recasting of a lost 
identity than the expression of a depressed social or economic situation.”93 At the same 
time, it would be difficult to eliminate the current social and economic situation faced by 
this group as a key reason for that lost identity. Additionally, it is little coincidence the 
increased relevance of the Muslim population in the 1990’s coincides with the coming of  
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age of the children of immigrants to the UK from the 70’s and 80’s. Once again, Muslims 
under 34 represent just over 70% of the total Muslim population (Figure 7), the youngest 
religious group in the UK. 
Roy goes on to describe four categories of what he refers to as “Protest 
Conversions” of Western European converts to Islam. The first category is the politicized 
rebels, who see Islam as a cause that fascinates or excites them due to its radical nature 
and anti-imperialistic doctrine. The second is the religious nomads, who find Islam 
following experimentation with several other religions. The third is the former addicts 
and petty thieves and criminals. These individuals find a support system both physically 
and emotionally. The final category is the Blacks, Latinos, and persons of mixed race, 
who see inclusion in radical Islamic groups as a rebuke of racism and a means to counter 
a system they feel discriminates against them.94 
Looking at the socioeconomic conditions such as education, unemployment, 
housing, welfare, and so on, as discussed in Chapter III, in an environment rife with 
significant disagreement over Western policies and actions in the Middle East, it is clear 
that any of the four categories explained by Roy could be used to describe a significant 
portion of the Muslim population in the UK. While that is not to say the entire population 
of Muslims in the UK are radicals waiting to attack their own government, it does help to 
place into perspective the issues faced regarding the divide between cultures. 
But why concentrate on Muslims instead of Buddhists, Christians, Socialists or 
Democrats? The answer is as simple as it is straightforward: no other group in the UK 
(religious, social, or political) has consistently acted in such an aggressive or inhospitable 
manner. Only Muslims have been afforded, and consistently taken advantage of, the 
opportunity to disregard compliance with the norms of the society of which they are a 
part. According to Anthony Glees, a professor at Brunel University in London, “It‘s 
political correctness gone mad.”95 Glees continues: 
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What it has done is to imply that the Muslim community, or the 
community of Muslims, has some kind of special status in the UK 
They’ve never done this for blacks. They’ve never done this for Jews. 
They’ve never done this for anybody. The government is treating a section 
of the British people differently than others, and that’s precisely what 
needs to be avoided.96 
It is exactly this “privileged” position that enables members of this special interest group 
to carry on as they do. Certainly, the majority of Muslims in the UK don’t have such 
violent tendencies, as indicated by the reaction of the wife of one of the July 7 bombers. 
Jermaine Lindsay’s wife, Lewthwaite Lindsay, denied Jermaine’s involvement until 
authorities produced forensic evidence to confirm his identity. She later went on record 
stating she abhorred the attacks and that her husband’s mind had been poisoned by 
radicals.97 Unfortunately, those unscrupulous few who do have such tendencies are not 
averse to abusing their position of privilege to further their own twisted aims. 
Islamist Abu Izzadeen provides a further, detailed description of the clash 
between Western democracy and Islamic ideology: 
There’s always a clash of civilisations, there’s always a clash of ideals. 
And because Islam is not written by a man, I can’t change it. But because 
democracy’s written by a man, they can change it to accommodate the 
Muslims. I’m born here. I have the right to call for Islam, wherever I am. 
And that’s a problem for the British society and establishment; that the 
community here, the new generation of Muslims, are born in the UK. We 
have a British passport, and British citizenship but our allegiance is only 
to Islam.98 
This attitude – that Islam operates outside and above political channels, that Islam cannot 
be argued with because it reflects the “reality” of the true faith – is given strength by the 
very freedom of the society it wishes to subsume. 
G. SUMMARY 
Multiculturalism is the belief that all cultures in a society are equal and must 
therefore be treated identically in all aspects including education, law enforcement, and 
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politics. Therefore, any imposition of the majority culture over a minority culture is seen 
as racism that must be immediately quashed. Regarding the integration of Muslim 
immigrants into British society, the past forty years have witnessed a trend towards 
multiculturalism and accomodation replacing earlier traditions of assimilation. This trend 
has resulted in significant divisions in British society, creating a situation where the 
minority culture now appears able to dictate the standards by which nearly all society will 
be educated and governed, gradually removing traditional British identity and values. 
This shift has enabled the recruitment of second and third generation British citizens to 
radical Islamic ideology and has provided significant support to such activities as the July 
7, 2005 attacks on the Underground. 
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V. ISOLATIONISM  
A. ALONE IN A CROWD 
Following several key events such as the July 2005 bombings in London and the 
October 2005 riots in France, the question must be addressed: has multiculturalism 
worked or has it supported the creation of barriers of isolation between Muslim and non-
Muslim culture within the very societies it was intended to unify? Furthermore, what role 
does this isolation play in the willingness of Western Muslims to attack their fellow 
countrymen in the name of Islam? 
In the previous chapter, we state that in fact, multiculturalism is a key issue in the 
difficulties faced in the UK today. However, it is important to recognize the situation is 
far more complex than a simple argument such as “multiculturalism created the isolation 
that subsequently supported acts of terrorism against Western society.” While we argue 
that multiculturalism played a key role in the isolation of Muslims from Western society, 
specifically in the UK, it is clear that multiple other related and intertwined factors, 
including education, social and economic status, and various religious influences, 
resulted in Western Muslims seeking to regain a cultural identity they had lost. In the 
end, multiculturalism may be as much a catalyst as it is a root cause. We also ask the key 
question, have we confused multiculturalism with acculturation? That is, are we correctly 
defining the problem as the emphasis of the equivalent relevance of all cultural groups – 
and specifically the underrepresented – instead of identifying the issue as the mere 
adaptation of individuals or groups to a culture, and the subsequent influence of those 
cultures on one another? 
With respect to the isolation of the Muslim population in Britain, the social and 
economic data presented in Chapter III provides clear evidence that this isolation exists. 
While other ethnic groups may occasionally rate lower in economic status or social 
achievement, no other group scores as consistently low as the Muslim population. Neither 
does any other group appear to be as isolated as this single group. Furthermore, no other 
group has repeatedly conducted high profile attacks directly against the government in 
the name of their ethnic group or religion – as small groups of Muslims have done. 
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Simultaneously, it is not only Muslims in Britain who appear to be isolated. Islam 
itself is struggling with what Olivier Roy has dubbed deculturalization, or the 
transformation to a globalized and stateless religion. This statelessness plays directly into 
the theory of acculturation where the group forms an identity within the state, but is 
neither connected to the state or with the group it ultimately identifies itself with. These 
groups have ultimately formed a hybrid that identifies with a greater group (Islam), yet 
they maintain highly unique traits and experiences. These factors have converged to 
result in the situation faced today in the UK. 
B. ISOLATIONISM DEFINED 
The “Draft Report on Young Muslims and Extremism” states the problem with 
Muslims in the UK is: 
. . . a feeling that parts of the Muslim community, particularly younger 
men, are disaffected. This includes some that are well educated with good 
economic prospects. Al Qaida [sic] and its off-shoots provide a dramatic 
pole of attraction for the most disaffected.99  
 
In the age of the Global War on Terror, it is all too easy to limit the negative 
sphere of influence to al Qaeda and company. Bin Laden and his counterparts have 
clearly influenced terrorists around the world. However, it is debatable whether al Qaeda 
remains as monolithic and capable as it was once perceived. Further, it is doubtful that al 
Qaeda is truly driving and coordinating terrorist recruiting efforts around the world, at 
least on the level that some would suggest. What is far more realistic is that as their 
translated name – The Base – suggests, al Qaeda has once again morphed, as it has 
multiple times throughout its existence, into a base of ideological support, rather than the 
training, logistical or financial base it once may have been. 
Olivier Roy credits the developing issue to one of globalized Islam, where 
Muslims – particularly those living in the West – have essentially developed into 
Muslims without a state. They are essentially members of a deterritorialized religion in a 
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religion that has been historically linked to territorial boundaries.100 The entire discussion 
of dar al-islam (House of Islam, or Muslim lands) and dar al-harb (House of War, or 
non-Muslim lands) is dependent on territorial boundaries. Also at issue is that Islam in its 
truest form is as much a form of government as it is a religion, which corresponds to the 
fundamentalist’s call for a sharia state. With the exception of the Taliban, no Muslim 
government has come close to implementing a “true” Islamic state (one based on sharia 
law), but throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, Muslim identity has been nonetheless 
directly related to state and politics. 
Dr. Aldeeb Abu Sahlieh, of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, ties the issue 
of isolation to a much deeper and religiously historical expectation regarding immigration 
of Muslims living in an infidel country. According to Sahlieh, this issue harkens back to 
the migration of Muhammed from Mecca to Medina and the reference to those Muslims 
remaining in Mecca as “immigrants.” Sahlieh provides the following Quranic reference 
to explain: 
Those whom the angels take in death while they wrong themselves, the 
angels will say, “What was your stand?” They will say, “We were abased 
in the land.” The angels will say, “Was not God’s earth wide, so that you 
might have emigrated in it?” Such as those, their abode shall be Gehenna; 
how wretched a destination! Except the feeble among men and women 
and children who can contrive nothing, and are not guided to a path. (4:97-
98) 
These two verses urge each Muslim living in an infidel country to leave it 
and join the Muslim community, unless he is unable. Other verses express 
the same sense (4:100; 9:20). The purpose of this migration was to protect 
them from persecution, to weaken the infidel community, and to 
participate in the effort of war of the new community. Therefore the 
Qur’an uses together the terms: those who believe, and those who 
emigrate and strive in the way of Allah (2:218; 8:72, 74, 75; 8:20; 
16:110).101 
It would be inappropriate for us to discount the relevance of Sahlieh’s argument 
regarding the deeper religious nature of Islamic isolationism in the West. Further, we 
must bear in mind that his detailed argument is based upon multiple references steeped in 
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the many Islamic schools of jurisprudence, combined with the discussion and relevance 
of dar al-islam and dar al-harb. Still, we will not address this aspect of the argument for 
three significant reasons. 
First, the authors of this document are non-Muslim and therefore not conversant 
with Islamic theology. Subsequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, for them to 
adequately address the theological issues involved in this discussion. While relevant to 
the intended purposes of this paper, this topic is better dealt with by religious scholars 
such as Sahlieh and other experts in this area of study. 
Second, much of the discussion as presented by Sahlieh is based on or around 
Quranic discussions of immigration from a non-Islamic country to an Islamic country. 
Since our discussion centers around Muslims willing to either continue migrating to 
Western nations, or continue living in the West as minorities, it would appear that while 
this argument may have some relevance, it is not the driving factor supporting isolation. 
Finally, Gilles Kepel states in his book The War for Muslim Minds that as early as 
the late 1980s, “the brothers [Muslim Brothers] and their heirs have no longer considered 
Europe a land of unbelief, but a land of Islam: Muslim children have now been born on 
European soil and are citizens of those countries.” Building on this declaration, the 
European Fatwa Council expressed its view that sharia law should now be applied to 
European Muslims. Both the jihadist and the pietistic branches of Salafism reject the 
inclusion of Europe in the land of Islam.102 Nonetheless, both Britain and Canada are 
examples of two countries that either allow limited application of sharia law or are 
considering allowing the implementation or integration of sharia law for Muslim 
communities and their citizens. The reality is that many Muslim groups have much 
greater religious and personal freedom in the West than in their Muslim countries of 
origin. 
C. THE ROOTS OF ISOLATION 
As stated, this paper will not address in detail the historical religious guidance on 
the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims living in non-Muslim countries. 
While the data discussed in Chapter III suggests multiple factors, it must at least be 
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mentioned how easily individuals could argue, and often do, that the lack of participation 
of Muslims in these societies is clearly related to religious teachings that discourage 
interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet even after a thorough analysis, this 
would clearly be an oversimplification. However, as the social and economic data 
suggests, this argument cannot be discounted completely as Muslims did rate amongst the 
highest of all the minorities regarding the role of religion in personal identity.103 
Looking closer at the role of identity, nearly three quarters of Muslims living in 
the UK saw religion as a significant aspect of their individual identity. Only two-thirds of 
other minority religious groups such as Sikhs and Hindus felt the same. The most 
significant group of Muslims to equate religion with personal identity were those in the 
16-24 age group. Of this group, 74% said religion was key to their personal identity. For 
other groups surveyed, 63% of the Sikhs, 62% of the Hindus, and 18% of the Christians 
surveyed identified religion as a key factor in their personal identity. Additionally, in the 
25-49 and over 50 age groups, both Muslims and Sikhs were the groups most likely to 
equate religion as an important part of their personal identity.104 
The above statistics become more relevant when considered in comparison with 
levels of civic participation amongst the same groups. Civic participation should be a sign 
of both inter-cultural and cross-cultural interaction between these groups.105 
Participation of Muslims in civic activities was significantly less than the 
participation of nearly all other faith groups, with only 30% of the Muslims surveyed 
engaged in some form of civic activity in the 12-month period prior to the survey. The 
survey did point out that two minority groups, Hindus and Sikhs, scored lower than 
Muslims in their amount of civic participation, at 23% and 28%, respectively.106 Once 
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again, however, the population represented by these two groups is significantly less than 
the Muslim population (Figure 1). 
Muslims in the age group 16-24 were the second least likely of all groups to 
volunteer, with only 24% having done so. The average for their age group as a whole was 
29%. Hindus and Sikhs scored the highest in this age group with 31% and 32%, 
respectively. The only group to score lower than Muslims aged 16-24 were Hindus over 
50. The group most likely to volunteer were those surveyed in the age group of 25-49, 
with Muslims ranking third behind those claiming no religion and Christians, and 
followed by Sikhs and Hindus, respectively. The 25-49 age group was also the most 
active group of all Muslims.107  
 
Figure 12.   Participated in Civic Activity in Last 12 Months by Age and Religious 
Affiliation (totals are percentages for each age group) (After Ref Draft Report on 
Young Muslims and Extremism)108 
 
Age Group  No religion Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh Total 
16-24  Yes 29 30 31 24 32 29 
 No 71 70 69 76 68 71 
 Respondents  408 664 105 517 74 1,797 
25-49  Yes 43 41 22 32 30 41 
 No 57 59 78 68 70 59 
 Respondents  1,378 4,061 440 1,346 219 7,624 
50 +  Yes 45 38 18 27 25 39 
 No 55 62 82 73 75 61 
 Respondents  593 4,541 232 332 95 5,873 
 
 
These statistics support concerns that younger Muslims are slowly becoming the 
most isolated group and potentially the most susceptible to extremism. Similar findings 
were discovered in reference to informal volunteering within the community. This is also 
significant, as previously discussed; Muslims under 34 represent just over 70% of the 
total Muslim population (Figure 7). It is also significant as trends suggest the younger age 
groups are traditionally the most civically involved. This is true in every case except 
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when concerning young Muslims. While individual statistics appear to be relatively 
consistent between groups, the cumulative effect of the Muslims’ generally lower 
numbers appears to manifest itself in a higher likelihood of terrorist activity from within 
this group. 
Roy discusses the issue of acculturation and points out there is a significant 
difference between an individual who is acculturated into a society versus an individual 
who is truly integrated – and one does not imply the other has occurred.109 In fact, 
acculturation may produce an effect opposite to that of the intended effects of 
multiculturalism, resulting in “the creation of dynamic and fluctuating subcultures, one of 
the most visible being a so-called ‘Muslim youth culture.’”110 
According to Roy, Muslims of foreign descent living in Europe can be described 
using five levels of identity: 
1. the transposition of an original, well-bonded solidarity group (based on 
geographical origin and/or kinship); 
2. a larger ‘ethnic’ or national identity, based on a common language and 
culture, which can include solidarity-group identity, often duplicated with 
a common citizenship; 
3. a neo-ethnic definition of Muslims, set by their genealogical ties with 
any kind of Muslim society, whatever their personal faith and religious 
practices, as sharing common sociocultural patterns in the anthropological 
sense (attitudes and values, but not language and literature); 
4. definition of a Muslim identity based exclusively on religious patterns, 
with no reference to a specific culture or language; and 
5. acculturation along Western lines, occasionally keeping the faith inside 
the home or, for some specific categories of youth, leading to the creation 
of a Western subculture, a marginal urban youth culture, sometimes recast 
into an ethnically described category (like the beur in France),111 but 
where today’s ‘ ethnicity’ has little to do with their father’s culture.112 
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Within the past several decades, Muslims in the West have increasingly found 
themselves living as a minority in predominately Christian cultures. Disparate social and 
economic conditions, the absence of a unifying Muslim identity, and limited identity with 
their country of citizenship have resulted in a sense of isolation from both the state and 
from traditional Islam. In this case, the state – while based on Judeo-Christian laws and 
principles – remains thoroughly secular. Contrast this with Islam, which is inherently 
linked to the state, and the potential for conflict is readily apparent. At both the individual 
and group levels, the reconciliation process has resulted in the deterritorialization of 
Islam.113 This deterritorialization has led to the development of at least a perceived 
identity with the greater Islamic community first, and an identity with the nation in which 
they reside as a much less significant piece of their personal identity. This loss of identity 
clearly correlates with the data discussed in Chapter III.  
In many cases, the result of this separation is the further social and economic 
isolation from the greater non-Muslim population. In its more extreme manifestations, the 
result is neo-fundamentalism, or “a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam 
that rejects the national and statistic dimension in favour of the ummah, the universal 
community of all Muslims, based on sharia (Islamic Law).”114 It is this neo-
fundamentalism that seems to be manifesting itself specifically in the second, third, and 
fourth generations who, at least partially due to the multicultural environment in which 
they were raised, and seeing no attachment to British national identity, attempt to capture 
their personal identity as Muslims by either discovering Islam for the first time or 
returning to a pure Islam (an Islam that is heavily influenced by the Salafi and Wahabbi 
schools of thought). These schools are also an Islam that is linked heavily to the greater 
Islamic community versus individual Islamic states. 
Two key groups that are active in the UK today include Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al 
Muhajiroon. While the groups claim no linkage to one another, there are many 
individuals studying this subject who claim linkages do exist despite the lack of any 
indisputable evidence. 
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In their own words, the group Hizb ut-Tahrir explains why the group was 
established: 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was established in response to the saying of Allah (swt), 
“Let there be among you a group that invites to the good, orders what is 
right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are successful” 
[TMQ 3:104] 
Its purpose was to revive the Islamic Ummah from the severe decline that 
it had reached, and to liberate it from the thoughts, systems and laws of 
Kufr, as well as the domination and influence of the Kufr states. It also 
aims to restore the Islamic Khilafah State so that the ruling by what Allah 
(swt) revealed returns.115 
In Arabic, Kufr refers to the unbeliever and in this context is difficult to interpret 
in any other way than to mean Western governmental and legal systems, specifically the 
British system. The group goes on to explain its intent to bring Muslims of the world 
under Shari’ah law.116 
Additionally, the group provides a three-stage process by which it intends to 
accomplish this goal. Once again the stages can clearly be interpreted to undermine the 
legitimate authority of the government. 
The First Stage: The stage of culturing to produce people who believe in 
the idea and the method of the Party, so that they form the Party group. 
The Second Stage: The stage of interaction with the Ummah, to let the 
Ummah embrace and carry Islam, so that the Ummah takes it up as its 
issue, and thus works to establish it in the affairs of life. 
The Third Stage: The stage of establishing government, implementing 
Islam generally and comprehensively, and carrying it as a message to the 
world.117 
The group Hizb ut-Tahrir is equally outspoken against both Western and what it 
sees as apostate or illegitimate Muslim regimes. What is significant about this group is 
that due to their “non-violent” stance they enjoy a legal status in Britain that they are not 
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afforded in many other European or even Muslim countries. This legality lends to their 
credibility and popularity both inside and outside the UK. Their legality in the UK has 
enabled the group to reach out to a worldwide audience from a legal British base of 
operations. In reality, this group is one of many that are seen as supporting additional 
isolation between Muslim and non-Muslim populations around the world. 
In relation to Western governments, the group’s rhetoric seeks to separate the 
Muslim population from the Western populations in which they reside. The group is very 
careful to maintain its level of rhetoric just short of civil disobedience – a key that could 
affect the legality of the group’s existence in Britain. In their own words: 
Within a western context Hizb ut-Tahrir does not make the dismantlement 
of the un-Islamic structures an issue. We recognise that the default 
position is that the political institutions are not from Islam. While we 
believe Muslims should not participate in these institutions, we do believe 
that Muslims can use all legitimate means to ensure their voices are 
heard.118 
While the group may not call for the dismantling of non-Islamic Western governments, it 
is difficult to interpret this language in any other way than to mean support for 
undermining legitimate governments. This is accomplished by encouraging Muslims not 
to participipate in or support the governments under which they live and in the case of the 
British system, the government that has gone to great lengths to accommodate them and 
provide freedoms a significant number of Muslims throughout the world do not enjoy. 
Additionally, when discussing the umma, as it does in stage two of its plan, the 
group in no way differentiates between a Western umma and a non-Western umma. This 
is because the umma is traditionally interpreted as the greater body of Muslims or the 
Islamic world, or community, as a whole. While it may sound alarmist, it is difficult to 
avoid comparing the stated strategy and intentions of an organization such as Hizb ut-
Tahrir with what David Galula describes as a “cold revolutionary war.” Galula describes 
this type of insurgency as a precursor to what he calls a “hot revolutionary war,” and 
during this phase the organization’s activity does in fact remain non-violent and legal. 
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Additionally, the eventual transition from cold to hot is gradual and therefore confusing 
to identify when it is actually taking place.119  
The first two steps in Galula’s process involve the creation of a central core or 
leadership followed by the development of a united front against its opponent. 
Essentially, this is what Hizb ut-Tahrir is describing in its three-stage process. Many of 
the allies in the united front will have varying levels of allegiance with the core group, 
with many being shed once the group gains the prominence necessary to act independent 
of these groups.120 This process may also involve first blind terrorism, for publicity, 
followed by more selective terrorism intended to isolate portions of the population from 
one another. This selective terrorism draws support from the desired portion of the 
population while driving a wedge between this desired population and the greater 
population.121 
To state that a group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is managing a global insurgency is 
clearly a bridge too far and would be completely inaccurate. However, the efforts and 
clearly-stated intent by multiple organizations claiming to act on behalf of the umma 
cannot be ignored as these groups are taking root and achieving incremental success 
towards their goals in countries that enable their existence. 
Al Muhajiroon, also with a distinct presence in the UK, is more specific in their 
feelings toward the isolation of Muslims from Western society, as pointed out in the 2004 
Draft Report on Muslim Extremism. The group was founded by Palestinian jurist Tagi-
ad-din Nabhani, with the organization in the UK founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad.122 
The report summarizes statements made by the group at their conferences in order to 
explain their intentions and methodologies as follows: 
l.) A Fatwa that those who join the British army are apostates and those 
who fight in Iraq or Afghanistan or elsewhere against Muslims are 
apostates because of their war against Muslims. 
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2.) That integration with the Kuffar (Non-Muslims) and their kufr (non-
belief) is not allowed and no one should be proud to [be] British or 
become MP’s, MI5 members, government officials, etc. Indeed to join 
these bodies is an act of apostasy. 
3.) To urge Muslims world-wide to work for the establishment of the 
Khilafah, a vital issue for Muslims today following 79 years living without 
an Islamic state. 
4.) To urge Muslims to support the Jihad wherever it is taking place, 
whether in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, etc- against the aggressors, 
usurpers and occupiers in those regions. 
5.) To call Muslims to do all they can to free the prisoners in Guantanamo 
Bay. 
6.) To call the Queen, the British establishment and the public to embrace 
Islam. 
7.) To explain that Muslims living in the US and UK are generally under a 
Covenant of security in that, in return for their life and wealth being 
protected they cannot attack the lives or property of the host nation. But 
those outside the UK & US do not have such a covenant with the UK and 
the US. 
8.) To tell Muslims not to be intimidated by the many new laws introduced 
against them, such as those related to terrorism, immigration or by the 
raiding of their mosques and homes. 
9.) To dignify and honour [sic] the Magnificent 19, who sacrificed their 
lives for Allah on 9/11. 
10.) To expose the moderate munafigeen (hypocrites) who start to cry for 
the British government, and yet claim they are defending Islam.123 
Interestingly, the organization existed openly in the UK from the mid-80s until August of 
2005, when it announced it had voluntarily disbanded following an announcement from 
Prime Minister Blair in August 2005 that the group would be placed on the list of known 
terrorist organizations. Few believe the group has actually disbanded and in reality has 
actually assumed multiple other names and remains quite active. 
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D. SUMMARY 
While multiculturalism may have played a key role in developing the current 
culture of isolation perceived by many Muslims in the UK, it has become a coequal in 
maintaining and even increasing the level of isolation with the reality of life that many 
Muslims face in the UK. Without a doubt, Muslims in the UK comprise a significant 
portion of the lower class of society. Multiculturalism, combined with socio-economic 
status, education, cultural issues, and perceived injustices perpetuate the Islamic 
population’s separation from the rest of society. Government policy concerning the 
Global War on Terror at home, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan, justifiable or not, 
further perpetuates the isolation of this community and feeds fear, hatred, dissatisfaction, 
and distrust that clearly exists. Admittedly, both Christian and Islamic concerns, customs, 
dress, and practices, further complicate the issue. 
Finally, Islamic groups and organizations, some well-meaning and some neo-
fundamentalists, continually encourage the isolation of the Islamic community as a whole 
from within Western society, therefore enabling the small minority to successfully plan 
and carry out acts of violence that drive a wedge further between these two cultures. The 
individuals capitalize on the isolation described in this paper to further drive a wedge 
























VI. CASE STUDIES 
What follows are three case studies of terrorist events in the UK. They are offered 
in chronological order, beginning with the successful London bombing of July 7, 2005. 
The second study outlines the personalities and events around the so-called “7-21 
bombing,” in which the bombs failed to detonate. The final study elaborates on the details 
of the unsuccessful plot to blow up multiple U.S.-bound airliners in August of 2006. It is 
important for the reader to understand that the nature of each of the cases has affected our 
ability to accurately characterize each situation. In the first case, all of the bombers died, 
and with the exception of two others – one of whom is in custody in Egypt – no one else 
is implicated in the attack. This includes the bombers’ family members. Because of this, 
the British Home Office was able to produce a detailed report (“Report of the Official 
Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005”)124 outlining the events based on 
interviews, forensic, and post-hoc investigation, both up to and resulting from the 
bombing.  
Differing standards in the release of pre-trial information between the UK and the 
United States have been evident since the first event on July 7, 2005. A key issue is the 
UK’s strict limitations on the release of pre-trial information intended to enable and 
ensure a fair trial. However, due to the highly visible nature of all three of these attacks, 
British authorities have clearly made the decision to be more forthcoming concerning 
these three events than in previous investigations. However, despite the level of 
information sharing, due to the fact that trials are either currently underway or have yet to 
begin, the majority of detailed information on the 7-21 attempted bombing and the airline 
plot have been derived from public forums and open-source documents, primarily media 
reports.  
Policy differences in information sharing have affected the level and type of 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the UK and the U.S. During the initial 
7-7 investigation, British officials expressed frustration over United States law 
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enforcement agencies’ willingness to provide detailed information – information that 
British authorities were completely unwilling to discuss, due to legal restrictions.  
A. LONDON, 7-7 
1. The Plot 
On the morning of July 7, 2005, four young men boarded vehicles in the London 
mass transit system and blew them up. 
Due to the closed, tightly-knit nature of their group, relatively few other 
individuals have come to be associated with the four bombers. Also, because they kept 
their intent hidden from even their family members, the majority of the facts in the case 
have come to light through intensive forensic investigative efforts. Finally, though there 
appear to be some “loose” links to al Qaeda (based on visits to Pakistan and al Qaeda 
claims of responsibility), these are tenuous at best. What seems more likely is that the 
four bombers were working independent from – but in the spirit of – al Qaeda. 
At 0850 on July 7, 2005, Shehzad Tanweer detonated the first bomb on an 
eastbound Circle Line sub-surface Underground train, number 204, traveling between 
Liverpool Street and Aldgate. The blast killed eight people (including Tanweer) and 
injured 171. Within 50 seconds, two other bombs exploded on two additional trains. 
Mohammad Sidique Khan detonated bomb number two on the second carriage of a 
westbound Circle Line sub-surface Underground train, number 216, traveling between 
Edgeware Road and Paddington. The blast killed seven people (including Khan) and 
injured 163. Jermaine (Jamal) Lindsay detonated the third subway bomb on a southbound 
Piccadilly Line deep-level Underground train, number 311, traveling between King’s 
Cross St. Pancras and Russell Square. The blast killed 27 people (including Lindsay) and 
injured over 340.125 
It is suspected that the fourth bomber, Hasib Mir Hussain, was meant to take the 
northern line from King’s Cross in order to form the fourth arm of a “cross of fire” with 
the explosions, symbolically centered around King’s Cross station. However, the 
northern line was delayed – and subsequently shut down as a result of the three other 
blasts. Further, Hussain appears also to have bought a nine-volt battery in the interim, so 
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there is speculation that his detonator was not working properly. Regardless, he boarded a 
surface transit bus, and at 0947 he detonated his bomb in Tavistock Square on the No. 30 
Dennis Trident 2 double-decker bus travelling from Marble Arch to Hackney Wick. The 
blast killed 14 people (including Hussain) and injured over 110.126  
The gruesome tally for the day: 52 dead commuters, an additional 700 injured, 
and four dead bombers.  
Other casualties included telephone networks (which were quickly overwhelmed 
with emergency calls), the public transport system, and (at least temporarily) the financial 
markets. Vodafone’s mobile phone network reached capacity at about 10:00 a.m. and 
initiated the ACCOLC, the “access overload control scheme.” Other mobile phone 
networks also reported failures. The Underground system was completely closed for the 
rest of the day, as were the Zone 1 bus networks. Tourist river vessels were pressed into 
service to ease the strain on remaining operational bus lines. Other than the affected lines, 
most of the Underground was running again the next morning (July 8, 2005). There were 
immediate reactions in many of the world’s financial markets, with the pound dropping to 
a 19-month low against the U.S. dollar, and markets in France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Spain closing about 1% down on the day. However, the end of the day saw only a 
1.36% decline from the previous day’s close in London – which was itself a three-year 
high.127 
These four bombs comprise the deadliest single act of terrorism in the UK since 
Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 270. It was 
also the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World War.128  
2. The Prelude  
There has been speculation regarding links between the bombers and another 
alleged al Qaeda cell in Luton, which was broken up in August 2004. That group was 
uncovered after al Qaeda operative Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan was arrested in 
Lahore, Pakistan. His laptop computer was said to contain plans for tube attacks in 
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London, as well as attacks on financial buildings in New York and Washington. The 
group was placed under surveillance, but on August 2, 2004, the New York Times 
published his name, citing Pakistani sources. The leak caused police in Britain and 
Canada to make arrests before their investigations were complete. The U.S. government 
later said they had given the name to some journalists as background, for which Tom 
Ridge, the U.S. homeland security secretary, apologized.129  
When the Luton cell was broken up, one of the London bombers, Mohammad 
Sidique Khan (no known relation to Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan), was briefly 
scrutinised by MI5, who determined that he was not a likely threat and he was not put 
under surveillance.130 
What follows is a timeline of the events leading to, and including, the bombings: 
15 July 2004: Hasib Hussain arrives at the Karachi airport on Saudi Arabian 
Airlines flight SV-714. No information is available on his departure from Pakistan.131 
19 November 2004: Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Sidique Khan fly into 
Karachi on Turkish Airlines Flight 1059, arriving November 19, 2004. The pair departs 
Karachi a week later on a train to Lahore.132 It is presumed that this is when the two of 
them made their “martyrdom videos,” which were presented to the world much later. 
This is also the time-frame during which al Zawahiri claims they would have attended an 
al Qaeda training camp. 
8 February 2005: Khan and Tanweer leave Pakistan on February 8, 2005, on 
Turkish Airlines Flight 1057.133  
                                                 
129 Wikipedia, “7 July 2005 London Bombings.” 
130 Wikipedia, “7 July 2005 London Bombings.” 
131 USAToday.com, “Pakistan Trying to Trace London Bombers’ Movements,” USAToday.com, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-07-18-bomb-pakistan_x.htm, July 18, 2005 (accessed February 
26, 2007). 
132 CNN.Com, “2 London Bombers visited Pakistan,” CNN.Com, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/ 
WORLD/europe/07/18/london.attacks/, July 18, 2005 (accessed February 26, 2007). 
133 CNN.Com, “2 London Bombers visited Pakistan.” 
69 
Late June 2005: Magdy El Nasher (alleged bomb-maker) leaves England for 
Cairo. Mohammed El Nasher later tells CNN his older brother Magdy arrived in Egypt 
June 30 and has been staying with him and his parents.134 
Early July 2005: A few days before the bombing, Tanweer rents a Nissan Micra 
from a local car-rental agency.135  
7 July 2005: Tanweer, Khan, Hussain, and Lindsay are believed to pick up the 
bombs from a house in the Burley area of Leeds, hiding them in large rucksacks. They 
then drive to Luton, Bedfordshire in the Nissan, which Tanweer leaves parked in Luton 
railway station car park.136  
7 July 2005, 0748: The four enter Luton station (captured on CCTV).137 
7 July 2005, 0748: The four go to London by Thameslink train.138  
7 July 2005, 0830: Bombers recorded on CCTV arriving at King’s Cross 
station.139  
7 July 2005, 0850: Three bombs explode on Underground trains. 
7 July 2005, 0947: Bomb explodes on transit bus.  
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Figure 13.   Routes The Suspects Took140 
 
 
1 The four men arrive at King’s Cross Thameslink station from Luton. They go to the 
tube station and fan out on different lines 
2 Shehzad Tanweer takes the Circle line eastbound. Bomb explodes between Liverpool 
St and Aldgate 
3 Lindsey Jermaine takes the Piccadilly line south. The train blows up before the first 
stop at Russell Square 
4 Mohammad Sidique Khan takes the Circle line westbound. Bomb explodes at Edgware 
Rd 
5 Hasib Hussain may have tried the Northern line but he ends up on the No. 30 bus. 
Bomb explodes at Tavistock Square 
3. The Aftermath 
7 July 2005, 1000: Hasib Hussain’s family reports him missing just after 1000.141 
Hussain’s family was completely in the dark as to his radical streak. After they hear of 
the blasts in London (and having been told by Hussain that he would be attending a 
religious function in London at that time), they call the “casualty line” to report him 
missing when they can’t reach him on his cell phone. 
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7 July 2005, 1200: At around 12:10 p.m. on 7 July, BBC News reports that a 
website known to be operated by associates of al-Qaeda has been located with a 200-
word statement claiming responsibility for the attacks. The news magazine Der Spiegel in 
Germany and BBC Monitoring both report that a group named “Secret Organisation — 
al-Qaeda in Europe” has posted an announcement claiming responsibility on the al-
Qal3ah (“The Castle”) Internet forum. The announcement claims the attacks are a 
response due to the British involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan. The letter also warns other governments involved in Iraq 
(mentioning specifically Denmark and Italy) to withdraw troops from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. A Saudi commentator in London notes that the statement is grammatically 
poor, and that a Qur’anic quotation is incorrect. This has been disputed.142  
09 July 2005: A second claim of responsibility is posted on the Internet on 9 July, 
claiming the attacks for another al Qaeda-linked group, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade. The 
group has previously falsely claimed responsibility for events that were the result of 
technical problems, such as the 2003 London blackout and 2003 blackout in the 
Northeastern U.S. They have also claimed authorship of the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings.143  
12 July 2005: Police raid six properties in the Leeds area: two houses in Beeston, 
two houses in Thornhill, one house in Holbeck and one house in 18 Alexandra Grove, 
Hyde Park. One man is arrested.144  
13 July 2005: The police raid a residential property on Northern Road in the 
Buckinghamshire town of Aylesbury.145  
14 July 2005: Magdy El Nasher is captured at his family’s home outside of Cairo. 
Nasher is alleged to have helped the bombers build their explosive devices.146 
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1 September 2005: Al Qaeda officially claims responsibility for the attacks in a 
videotape aired on the Arab television network al Jazeera.147 On the tape, Mohammad 
Sidique Khan says:  
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our 
drive and motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this 
world has to offer. Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God 
and following the footsteps of the final prophet messenger.  
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them 
makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.  
Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the 
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop 
this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the 
reality of this situation.148 
The tape has been edited and also featured al Qaeda number two, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, in a way intended to suggest a direct link between Khan and Al Qaeda. There 
has been no report that Khan said anything linking the bombing to al Qaeda.149 
06 July 2006: On the eve of the first anniversary of the attacks (6 July 2006), Al 
Jazeera airs another taped message from one of the bombers – Shehzad Tanweer. He 
says:  
For the non-Muslims in Britain, you may wonder what you have done to 
deserve this. You are those who have voted in your government who in 
turn have and still continue to this day continue to oppress our mothers 
and children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported 
the genocide of more than 150,000 innocent Muslims in Fallujah.  
We are 100 per cent committed to the cause of Islam. We love death the 
way you love life. I tell all you British citizens to stop your support to your 
lying British government and to the so-called war on terror. And ask 
yourselves: why would thousands of men be ready to give their lives for 
the cause of Muslims?  
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What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks 
which will intensify and continue to until you pull all your troops out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Until you stop all financial and military support to 
the US and Israel and until you release all Muslim prisoners from 
Belmarsh and your other concentration camps. And know that if you fail 
to comply with this then know that this war will never stop and that we are 
willing to give our lives 100 times over for the cause of Islam. You will 
never experience peace until our children in Palestine, our mothers and 
sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.150 
The film again features commentary from the al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-
Zawahiri. He says Tanweer’s beliefs explain why he was drawn into al Qaeda, and why 
he and Mohammad Sidique Khan “wished that they could carry out a martyrdom 
operation.” Al Zawahiri adds that Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammad Sidique Khan 
attended an al Qaeda camp. It was known that the two had visited Pakistan, and visited 
madrassas, but the claim that they been trained at an al Qaeda camp is new.151  
4. The Players 
Name: Mohammad Sidique (Sid) Khan152 
Age: 30 (October 20, 1974), born in Leeds 
Role: Edgware Road bomber, suspected ringleader153 
Date of Death: July 7, 2005 
Place of Death: UK 
Nationality: British / Pakistani154  
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan155 
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
Family Ties: Youngest of  six children, married (Hasini Patel), one daughter. 
Employment: Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing;156 Reportedly had 
previously served as teaching assistant at Hillside Primary School, Leeds,157 
dismissed from job in 2004 due to poor attendance158 
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Address: Beestown area of Leeds; Lees Holm, Dewsbury159 
Additional Information:  
Graduated Leeds Metropolitan University 1996160 
Volunteered in the local community161 
Traveled to Pakistan for three months with Tanweer following dismissal from job 
in 2004162 
  
Name: Hasib Mir Hussain163 
Age: 18 (September 16, 1986), born in West Yorkshire 
Role: Tavistock Square (bus) bomber 
Date of Death: July 7, 2005 
Place of Death: UK 
Nationality: British / Pakistani164  
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan165 
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
Family Ties: Youngest of four children. 
Employment: Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing.166 
Address: Colonso Mount, Holbeck area of Leeds,167 Lived with parents168 
Additional Information:  
Left school in July 2003 with seven GCSEs169 
Traveled to Pakistan to visit relatives and also went on Hajj in 2002170 
Completed College level advanced business course in June 2005171 
 
Name: Shehzad (Kaka) Tanweer172 
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Age: 22 (December 15, 1982), born in Bradford, West Yorkshire173 
Role: Aldgate bomber 
Date of Death: July 7, 2005 
Place of Death: UK 
Nationality: British / Pakistani174  
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan175 
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
Family Ties: Second of four children (eldest son) 
Employment: Working in his father’s fish and chips shop at the time of the 7-7 
bombing.176 
Address: 51 Colwyn Road, Beeston, Leeds 
Additional Information:  
Traveled to Pakistan with Khan in November 2004177 
Suspected to have visited Pakistan in 2003 as well when he attended a 
madrassa178 
Graduate of Leeds Metropolitan University in sports science 179 
Outspoken in support of radical Islam180 
 
Name: Jermaine (Jamal) Lindsay181 
Age: 19 (September 23, 1985), born in Jamaica 
Role: King’s Cross bomber 
Date of Death: July 7, 2005 
Place of Death: UK 
Nationality: Jamaica182  
Country of Family Origin: Jamaica183 
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
Family Ties: Only child, married (Samantha / Sherafiyah), one child 
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Employment: Unemployed at the time of the 7-7 bombing.184 Drew 
unemployment benefits185 
Address: Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire;  
Additional Information:  
Family moved to the UK in 1986186 
raised in West Yorkshire from 1999 until 2003187 
Converted to Islam in 2000188 
Outspoken in support of al Qaeda189 
His name is alternately spelled “Germaine.” 
 
Name: Magdy el Nasher190 
Age: 33(as of July 16, 2005) 
Role: Suspected bomb-maker 
Date of Arrest: July 14, 2005 
Place of Arrest: Cairo, Egypt 
Nationality: Egyptian 
Country of Family Origin: Egypt 
Other Affiliation: Islamic Society at Leeds University 
Family Ties:   
Employment:  
Address:  
Additional Information: Owned the bomb factory (flat) in Leeds 
Awarded Ph.D. in Chemistry from Leeds Metropolitan University (2005) 
 
Name: Haroon Rashid Aswat191 
Age: 31 (as of July 21, 2005)  
Role: Not clearly defined 
Date of Arrest: Late July, 2005 
Place of Arrest: Zambia (Deported to UK on August 7, 2005)192 
Nationality: British (born in India) 
Country of Family Origin: India 
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Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: (Family: Batley, in Yorkshire)193 
Additional Information: AKA: Abu Ubaid 
Police sources have told newspapers that Aswat made some 20 mobile phone calls 
to two of the suspected bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad 
Tanweer, one just hours before the blasts. He was monitored entering Britain at 
Felixstowe, Suffolk in late June 2005 and then departing via Heathrow hours 
before the attacks.194 
Aswat is believed to have helped set up a terrorist training camp in Oregon in the 
United States in 1999.195 
Terrorism expert John Loftus said that Rashid was an MI6 informant and had 
been for many years. According The New Criminologist, it has been confirmed by 
leading U.S. and French intelligence asset/agents.196 
He was believed killed in Afghanistan, as his identification papers were found on 
the body of a Taliban fighter.197 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is almost nothing in their backgrounds to indicate a radical, terrorist bent, 
yet these four men perpetrated the most egregious terror attack in the UK since 
Lockerbie. Their lives and problems were typical of the majority of Britons, with the 
exception of how they chose to end them. These six individuals do however fit many of 
the socio-economic categories highlighted in chapter two. Three of the terrorists appear 
to have been born in the United Kingdom and at least four of them possessed either single 
or dual citizenship. Those possessing dual citizenship also claimed Pakistani citizenship, 
which supports data suggesting half of this group were ethnically Pakistani. Concerning 
age, all of the individuals were under thirty-four, with three of the terrorists under the age 
of 24. Finally, three of the terrorists were definitely unemployed at the time of the attack; 
one individual was employed in what was classified as an unskilled job. The employment 
status of the remaining two individuals is unclear. 
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A key concept in understanding the relevance of this bombing is that despite all 
the ensuing detailed forensic investigation, only two people – other than the bombers – 
have been implicated in the plot. While anecdotal, it is illustrative of Sageman’s point 
about the evolution of al Qaeda since 9-11 – that is, it’s now a loose network of 
ideologically-aligned radicals. Even the Home Office Report echoes Sageman’s thoughts, 
stating “the process of indoctrinating these men appears principally to have been through 
personal contact and group bonding.”198 The official assessment appears to be that these 
men were ideologues with little (or no) connection to al Qaeda. According to what they 
understood of Islam, they were doing something good for the cause. Of course, any 
strategist worth his salt could point out that attacks such as this, while spectacular and 
attention-getting, will only serve to sour popular support in the long run. It is that popular 
support, rather than outright fear, which they need in order to be ultimately successful. 
The bombers’ comments in their martyrdom videos lend further credence to 
Sageman’s proposal that al Qaeda has morphed from a tightly-controlled multi-national 
terror organization (if it ever was anything approaching that), and into something more 
akin to a loose network of ideologically linked radicals who are willing to use the 
hardline Islamist philosophy to justify their own desire for action of any kind. It is telling 
that at no time in their videos do Khan or Tanweer mention that their actions are done in 
the name of al Qaeda. Rather, it is left to al Qaeda operatives to edit the tape later and add 
their imprimatur. 
B. LONDON, 7-21 
1. The Plot 
As stated on July 22, 2005, in reference to the actions of the day prior: 
Perhaps, the most disconcerting aspect of the incidents is that they took 
place just two weeks after the worst terrorist attack on English soil killed 
56 people, setting off a massive international investigation and putting 
London on its highest security level since September 2001. Those 
responsible for yesterday’s incidents managed to operate in spite of a 
police hunt for the possible support base behind the July 7 bombs. They 
also managed to evade a big increase in visible policing on the public 
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transport system and outside other key buildings, including the use of 
bomb sniffer dogs and enhanced patrols of armed officers.199 
The events of July 21, 2005, seem to have unfolded as follows: 
• 12:25 p.m. – Three suspects enter Stockwell subway station in south 
London on their way to their targets. 
• The first bomber, Ramzi Mohammed, wearing a sweatshirt with New 
York in large letters across the chest, attempts to detonate his backpack on 
a Northern Line train making its way to Oval station. The bomb fails to 
detonate and the man escapes in the Brixton area. 
• The second bomber, Ibrahim Muktar Said, is suspected to have entered the 
No. 26 bus at 12:53 p.m. but disembarks 12 minutes later after failing to 
detonate his backpack. 
• The third bomber, Yassin Hassan Omar, attempted, but fails to detonate 
his backpack aboard a Victoria Line train heading north. 
• The fourth bomber, Hussein Osman, is suspected of following a separate 
route to his destination, the Hammersmith and City Line near Sheperd’s 
Bush station, where he also tries and fails to detonate his bomb. 
• A fifth Backpack, carried by Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, is discovered in the 
Little Wormwood Scrubs Park not far from the location where the fourth 
bomber fled. The intended target for this device is unclear. 
The public, the media, and the investigators all immediately noted similarities 
between the 7-7 bombings and the attempted bombings of July 21, 2005.  
The attacks came two weeks to the day after the July 7 bombings and 
seemed intended to duplicate them. Besides involving backpack bombs, 
they were nearly simultaneous, and the targets again were three subways 
and a double-decker bus distributed roughly in a cross pattern centered on 
the heart of London. That configuration could evoke the “flaming cross” 
described in a claim of responsibility on an extremist Islamic website after 
the first attacks.200 
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These similarities gave rise to fears and questions as to whether or not the July 21 
bombers had acted in tandem with the 7-7 bombers or if the attack was simply a hastily 
developed copycat attack:   
According to John Wyatt, a bomb disposal expert and security adviser, the 
“most worrying aspect” of the incidents is that they point to a second cell, 
operationally separate to that involving the July 7 attacks, although 
perhaps linked to the same organisation or beliefs. “Whether this was a 
deliberate attempt at a copycat attack that failed is difficult to rule in or 
out. But the incidents do confirm there are people still around prepared to 
strike at London again.201 
Other similarities between the attacks existed, including the targets themselves. Both of 
the attacks targeted three subway cars and a red double-decker bus,202 the bus being 
perhaps one of the most internationally recognizable features of London. Also similar 
was the discovery in the 7-7 investigation of unexploded bombs in a car at a train station 
in London. A fifth device was abandoned in the July 21 case as well.  
However, there were differences in the construction of the bombs used in the 
separate attacks possibly suggesting separate bomb makers. “Unlike the bombs used in 
the deadly July 7 attacks, the devices found two weeks later featured a classic signature 
of suicide attackers: hand-triggers requiring the bombers to ignite the explosives,” an 
unnamed Italian official said.203 During the course of the investigation, video and 
eyewitness accounts would describe the would-be bombers appearing to dig through or 
reach into their backpacks just prior to minor explosions. 
Surprisingly, the reassuring part of the attack was that the bombs used on July 21 
failed to detonate. As a result, the backpacks found at the Sheperd’s Bush, Warren Street, 
and Oval Tube stations along with the fifth discarded backpack later discovered at the 
Little Wormwood Scrubs Park, and yet another found in one of the bombers residence, 
would be combined with CCTV and eye witness accounts, allowing investigators to 
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quickly begin piecing together the events of July 21. This critical evidence would not 
only enable the rapid identification of the individuals involved, a luxury that was not 
allowed to investigators in the investigation of the 7-7 attacks, but if the attacks were 
related, the evidence would provide insight into the attacks of 7-7. 
In piecing together why the bombs did not explode, investigators initially seem to 
have begun with the general assumption the bombs used on July 21 were constructed by 
the same bomb maker. From this point, experts suggest the likelihood that either an error 
in construction was repeated in each device or the same faulty material was used 
throughout the construction process. “Starting from the premise that the four bombs were 
assembled by the same expert from the same stock of explosives, it’s very imaginable 
that the same error was repeated in the assembly of each device or that in fact the 
explosive was of bad quality,” said Claude Moniquet of the European Strategic 
Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels think tank.204 Yet another possibility was 
that if the two attacks were related, the explosives could possibly have been built either 
by the same bomb maker or at similar times: 
If surviving members of the same network attempted a follow-up attack, 
their bombs might have malfunctioned because they contained the same 
explosive prepared for the first attacks, experts said. 
U.S. and European law enforcement officials have said it appears that 
triacetone peroxide, or TATP, was used in the first blasts, and that 
explosive mix is volatile and deteriorates with time.  
With these home-grown explosives, it could have gotten old on them,” a 
U.S. law enforcement official said.205 
Within a week of the second bombing, investigators confirmed the materials used 
to construct the bombs in both the 7-7 bombings and the July 21 failed attempts were 
similar. Both sets of bombs were referred to as TATP, made from a mixture of bleach, 
drain cleaner, acetone, hydrogen peroxide, and mineral acid. Investigators also began to 
consider the plastic containers used to encase the explosives. Investigators saw  
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similarities between the containers used in the two attacks and felt it was yet another clue 
the two events were related.206 It is unclear how useful this piece of information was or 
still is in the overall investigation. 
The end result of the second bombing was the detonators for the bombs did 
explode, but the main charges did not. Speculation once again arose that the materials for 
the second bombing were the same as those used in the first and that degradation was the 
likely reason for the failure.207 
2. The Players 
Throughout the investigation multiple sources, including the bombers themselves, 
suggested the entire plan was an elaborate hoax to build upon the fear created following 
the 7-7 attacks and make a statement concerning the West’s involvement in the Middle 
East and Muslim affairs. However, such indicators as the construction of the bombs and 
other activities prior to the attacks suggest otherwise.  
Yassin Hassan Omar was reportedly married at the North Finchley Mosque just 
four days prior to the attacks. Life changing rituals are typical actions for suicide 
bombers in the period leading up to a martyrdom operation. Interestingly, Omar had 
previously criticized the mosque for what he saw as its failure to espouse radical Islam. 
Additionally, the wedding was described as well above those usually seen in the mosque, 
which usually consist of attendance by only the guardian and two witnesses. This 
wedding was a significantly larger event, including a celebratory feast for friends and 
family.208 
Hussein Osman, also known as Hamdi Isaac, initially fled to Italy where he was 
detained and eventually extradited back to the UK. It was learned that Osman was 
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associated with international terrorism, although the links in his association were not 
published.209 It was also discovered from an unnamed Saudi official that Osman made a 
phone call to Saudi Arabia just prior to his arrest in Italy.210 
While in Italy, Osman reportedly provided Italian authorities a confession and 
description of the events leading up to July 21. He maintained that Ibrahim Muktar Said 
was the group’s leader and the plan was only to frighten the people of London, not kill 
them. Osman maintained the backpacks contained a mixture of flour and other materials 
that were not intended to explode. He also maintained, according to an unnamed Italian 
official, “Ibrahim designated the targets and built the knapsack bombs . . . a very basic 
design . . . Muktar prepared all five backpacks in 24 hours . . . and they were ready to 
go.”211 The pair, Osman and Ibrahim, according to reports, initially met at a gym in 
Notting Hill where Ibrahim showed Osman videos of the war in Iraq and explained that 
something had to be done.212 Concerning the claim that the explosives were never meant 
to explode, prosecutor Nigel Sweeney stated: 
. . . forensic scientists had tested the mixture, and “in every experiment 
this mixture has exploded.”  
The detonators contained triacetone triperoxide, an explosive used by 
Palestinian suicide bombers. The explosives were packed in plastic tubs, 
with screws, bolts and other pieces of metal taped on the outside as 
shrapnel . . . the hydrogen peroxide was a concentrated form.  
. . . the components for the bombs were bought beginning in April 2005, 
proving the attacks were “not some hastily arranged copycat” of the July 7 
transit bombings.  
                                                 
209 Kristine Crane and Marc Champion, “Italy Court Clears Bombing Suspect for Extradition; News is 
Welcome in UK, Where Leak Over a Shooting Shakes Law Enforcement,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 
2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=884210711&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName= 
PQD (accessed February 24, 2007). 
210  Kevin Sullivan, “Italians Turn Over Suspect in Failed London Attack,” The Washington Post, 
September 23, 2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=901435031&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT= 
309&VName=PQD (accessed February 24, 2007). 
211 Fleishman and Rotella, “London Bomb Suspects Stood Out as Radicals.” 
212 Sullivan, “Italians Turn Over Suspect in Failed London Attack.” 
84 
. . . police had found extremist Islamic literature in the suspects’ 
apartments, and several had attended the Finsbury Park Mosque to hear 
speeches by now-jailed radical preacher Abu Hamza al Masri.213 
Neighbors described Issac as a muscular man who wore Islamic robes, even as he 
rode his bike. He is reported to have regularly attended the Finsbury Park Mosque in 
South London, a significant distance from his apartment near the Oval subway station. As 
described by the Stockwell mosque leadership, Issac is known for his attempt, along with 
others referred to as extremists, to take over the mosque in Stockwell, South London.214 
During the course of the investigation, police found numerous items including 
extremist literature, videos, and homemade films. One of the items discovered is what is 
believed to be the suicide note signed by Ramzi Mohammed himself. The note is 
reportedly in Arabic and reads: 
First of all, I beg God to accept this action . . . and that he admits me to the 
highest station in paradise, for verily he grants martyrdom to whomever he 
wills. 
Secondly, to my family, don’t cry for me, but instead rejoice in happiness 
and love. What I have done is for the sake of God, for he loves those who 
fight for his sake.215 
The following is a list of known suspects in the attempted bombing: 
Name: Ibrahim Muktar Said216 
Age: 27 (January 1978) 
Role: Attempting to detonate device on a number 26 bus in Hackney 
Date of Arrest: 29 July, 2005 
Place of Arrest: Not stated 
Nationality: British / Eritrea217  (Applied 2003 / naturalized Sept 2004) 
Country of Family Origin: Eritrea218 
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Other Affiliation:  
Family Ties:  
Employment: Drawing welfare (under multiple identities) 219 
Address: Shared apartment with Yassin Hassan Omar in New Southgate, north 
London 
Additional Information: 
Born in Eritrea and came to the UK in1992 at age 14 
Arrived in Britain 1990s220 
1996: Sentenced to a total of five years in jail for robbery, attempted robbery, and 
handling stolen goods221 
Discovered Islam in the same penitentiary as Richard Reid222 
Arrested together at their apartment on July 29, 2005 
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, 
conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life223 
Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu224 (Real name possibly Sumaila Abubakari)225 
Age: 32 
Role: Connected to unexploded bomb in Little Wormwood Scrubs Park 
Date of Arrest: Not stated 
Place of Arrest: Not stated (voluntarily contacted police)226 
Nationality: British / Ghana227 
Country of Family Origin: Ghana228 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: no fixed address229                                                  
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Additional Information: 
Came to Britain in 2003 from Ghana using the name George Nanak Marquaye230 
Charged with conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to cause explosions that would 
threaten life231 
Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Hussein Osman (Hamdi Isaac) 232 
Age: 27 
Role: Attempting to bomb the Hammersmith and City Line train at Sheperd’s 
Bush 
Date of Arrest: July 29 2005 
Place of Arrest: Rome (Brother-in-laws apartment) 
Nationality: British / Ethiopia233 
Country of Family Origin: Ethiopia234 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Drawing welfare (under multiple identities) 235 
Address: no fixed address236 
Additional Information: 
Born in Ethiopia 
Youngest of five brothers237 
Moved to Italy in 1989238 
Moved to Britain in 1996239 
Posed as a Somali in order to gain residence240 
Married to Yeshshiemebet Girma, daughter of an Ethiopian diplomat241 
Extradited to the UK in September 2005 
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, 
conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life242                                                  
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Flown from Rome to London on Sept 22, 2005 where he was immediately 
arrested and charged 
Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Yassin Hassan Omar243 
Age: 24 (January 1981)244 
Role: Attempting to detonate device on the London Underground Victoria Line 
between Oxford Circus and Warren Street (The bomb was discovered still in the 
rucksack, inside his house)245 
Date of Arrest: July 27, 2005 
Place of Arrest: Birmingham, UK 
Nationality: Somali246 
Country of Family Origin: Somalia247 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Drawing welfare248 
Address: Shared apartment with Muktar Said in New Southgate, north London 
Additional Information: 
Born in Somalia 
Arrived in UK in 1992 at the age of 11 
Granted exceptional leave to remain in Britain in May 2000 
Received GNVC (vocational equivalent to 4 GCSEs) in intermediate science249 
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, 
conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life250 
Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Ramzi Mohammed251 
Age: 23 
Role: Attempting to detonate device on the tube near Oval station 
Date of Arrest:  
Place of Arrest:  
                                                 
243 BBC News, “London Attacks.” 
244 BBC News, “‘Bomb Plot’ Trial: The Six Defendants.” 
245 Jonathan Guthrie, “Streets of Britain See Yet Another Police Raid: Residents are Evacuated and 
Roads Closed in the Midlands City of Birmingham in what is Becoming a Familiar Scene,” Financial 
Times, July 28, 2005, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=874092771&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT= 
309&VName=PQD (accessed February 24, 2007). 
246 Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe. 
247 Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe. 
248 Champion, et al., “British Police Arrest Bomb Suspect.” 
249 Champion, et al., “British Police Arrest Bomb Suspect.” 
250 BBC News, “21 July Plot Suspects: Charges in Full.” 
251 BBC News, “London Attacks.” 
88 
Nationality: Somali 
Country of Family Origin: Somalia252 
Other Affiliation:  
Family Ties: Brother Wharbi Mohammed 
Employment:  
Address: North Kensington, West London253 
Additional Information: 
Arrested together at their apartment on July 29, 2005 
Charged with attempted murder, Conspiracy to murder, possession of explosives, 
conspiracy to cause explosions that would threaten life254 
Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Adel Yahya 
Age: 23 (September 1979)255 
Role: Unclear 
Date of Arrest: Not clearly stated 
Place of Arrest: Not clearly stated 
Nationality: British / Ethiopia256 
Country of Family Origin: Ethiopia257 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: Tottenham area of north London258 
Additional Information: 
Born in Ethiopia259 
Attended both City and Islington College and London Metropolitan University260 
Departed Britain in June 2005 (six week prior to attempted bombing) and arrested 
upon return on December 19, 2005 261 from Ethiopia262 
Charged with conspiracy to endanger life by an explosive substance263 
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Trial began January 15, 2007 
 
Name: Whabi Mohammed 
Age: 22 
Role: Also suspected of abandoning rucksack containing a bomb in Little 
Wormwood Scrubs Park.264 
Date of Arrest: Not clearly stated 
Place of Arrest: Not clearly stated 
Nationality: Somalia265 
Country of Family Origin: Somalia266 
Other Affiliation: none stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Ramzi Mohammed 
Employment: None stated 




Name: Haroon Rashid Aswat 
Age: 30 
Role: Suspected of coordinating role in attacks267 
Date of Arrest: Not clearly stated 
Place of Arrest: Zambia268 
Nationality: British269 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: None stated 
Additional Information: 
Indian descent270 
Born in Dewsbury, Yorkshire271 
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Former top aide to Abu Hamza al-Masri272 
Police may no longer be interested in questioning273 
 
3. The Trial 
The trial of the failed bombers began in January of 2007 and will be ongoing at 
the completion of this thesis. With the four bombers from the 7-7 attacks dead, these six 
men from the July 21 attack are the first to stand trial relating to any of the three major 
plots in the UK. Despite the ongoing trial, the prosecutions case thus far does provide 
some insight into the actions and preparations of the six men.  
Prosecutors allege Ibrahim Muktar Said, the ringleader as stated by Osman in his 
confession, traveled to Sudan in 2003 as well as Pakistan in December 2004. Both trips 
are alleged to have been to either conduct training or to actually participate in jihad.274 
Ibrahim also reportedly took a month-long trip to Saudi Arabia in 2003.275 The time of 
the year and the purpose of the trip were not provided. 
As it turns out, a police officer at Heathrow Airport spent four hours questioning 
Ibrahim at the airport just prior to his nine-month trip to Pakistan. Additionally, only a 
few months prior to his trip, he had been detained for distribution of “inflammatory” 
material on Oxford Street.276 The prosecution contends planning for the July 21 attack 
began not long after his return from Pakistan in sometime March 2005:277 
At that time, according to the prosecution, the suspects began assembling 
material to fashion an explosive made of hydrogen peroxide mixed with 
flour. The detonators were made of a high explosive called triacetone 
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triperoxide, or TATP, and would be set off by an electrical current from a 
nine-volt battery. 
The main explosives were to be packed in plastic containers surrounded 
with ‘‘screws, tacks, washers or nuts,’’ Mr. Sweeney said, adding that 
when the attempts took place, one of the men, Mr. Asiedu, lost his nerve 
and ‘‘dumped his bomb in a wooded area.’’ 
But Mr. Ibrahim, Mr. Osman, Mr. Omar and Mr. Mohamed set off with 
bombs on July 21, three of them on subway trains and one on a bus, the 
prosecutor said, a configuration of targets similar to that of July 7. 
In all four cases, the detonators exploded but the main charges did not, 
because the hydrogen peroxide was not sufficiently concentrated . . . 
The men bought 284 bottles of hydrogen peroxide – sold in a diluted form 
– and sought to make it more concentrated by warming it or boiling it over 
a stove at Mr. Omar’s apartment using two saucepans and a frying pan on 
an electric cooker . . . 
The men purchased the peroxide using a cover story that they needed it for 
stripping wallpaper or bleaching wood . . . they also made a suicide video 
at Mr. Mohamed’s home in West London. 
When the bombs failed, Mr. Osman fled to Italy while Mr. Omar left 
London disguised as a woman in a burqa, taking a bus to Birmingham on 
July 22 . . .278 
The jury has also been shown CCTV footage showing Ibrahim attempting to 
detonate his bomb on the bus, followed by panicked passengers fleeing. The prosecution 
explained how Osman fled the Warren Street station after the failure of his device to 
explode. Osman reportedly ran into a woman in Muslim dress and demanded that she 
take him home. When the woman refused, Osman reportedly chastised her for not 
helping another Muslim in need.279 
The actions of Ramzi Mohammed were also caught on video and were played for 
the jury: 
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The black-and-white images are jerky and hard to make out, but a man can 
be seen standing on the Northern Line subway as it heads toward central 
London. He is carrying a large backpack and wearing a hooded shirt with 
the words “New York” written across the front.  
Minutes later, the man turns so that his pack is wedged next to a young 
mother and her baby carriage. He lurches forward, and suddenly the 
screen is filled with passengers leaping from their seats and plunging to 
the other side of the car. The man is left standing, arms outstretched, 
swaying. His backpack lies in a heap on the floor, oozing a yellow, foamy 
substance.  
From these public video camera images, several witnesses were able to 
identify Ramzi Mohammed, a 25-year-old resident of West London. So, it 
turns out, were the police.280 
4. Conclusions 
Although there are numerous unanswered questions in this case, what does seem 
apparent is that we are facing an entirely new terrorist threat. In the words of M.J. Gohel, 
head of the Asia-Pacific Foundation: 
This trial once again reiterates that we are now facing a new generation of 
al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, individuals born or brought up in the West, 
solid middle-class background, normally no criminal record, possessing all 
the Western social skills, and crucially, valid Western passports for ease of 
travel, making these individuals almost impossible to profile.  
Whilst we are sealing borders and watching airports, al Qaeda is recruiting 
individuals from within [our own] nations.281 
Or as Marc Sageman more poignantly puts it: 
There is no such thing as al Qaida as it existed before we went to 
Afghanistan and destroyed it. 
We won the war against the old al Qaida, but we’re not winning against 
the global social movement that al Qaida was part of, because more and 
more kids are joining the movement.282 
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Still, there are some disturbing and striking similarities between the 7-7 and the 
July 21 bomb plot that cannot be ignored and must be addressed. As Mr. Gohel states 
further: 
Firstly, this particular cell was mainly composed of Muslims from the 
Horn of Africa. The previous plot was mainly Pakistani origins. Yet both 
plots are nearly identical, virtually almost in every respect. And on top of 
that, [members of each] . . . cell had gone to Pakistan 
This would seem to suggest that there was somebody who was 
orchestrating both of these plots . . . though we are capturing the foot 
soldiers, as it were, the people who are perpetrating and launching these 
atrocities here, we are not actually catching the mystery men, the people 
who are recruiting them, financing them, training them.283 
That being said, the socio-economic characteristics of this group fit the expected 
results less than the 7-7 bombings and the airline plot, but similarities remain. Once 
again, all eight of the individuals were under the age of thirty-four, with four of the 
individuals also under the age of twenty-four. This group differed in that the place of 
birth of four of the individuals was indeterminable, and none of the remaining three were 
born in the United Kingdom. However, as pointed out earlier, at least two of these 
individuals spent at least half of their lives, beginning as children, living in the UK. 
While place of birth was not clearly stated, at least one individual possessed single 
British citizenship – suggesting the possibility he was born in the United Kingdom. Of 
the remaining seven, four possessed dual British citizenship. Also different in this case, 
while one of the terrorist’s ethnicity was indeterminable the remaining seven were of 
predominantly North African ethnicity. 
C. THE AUGUST 2006 AIRLINE BOMB PLOT  
1. The Plot 
The New York Times began with the following disclaimer in an article published 
on August 28, 2006, “Residents of the UK are requested not to read, download or 
disseminate this article. This request arises from British laws that prohibit publication of 
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information that could be deemed prejudicial to defendants charged with a crime.”284 
Whether or not the warning served its purpose is unknown, but the statement highlighted 
the key journalistic and legalistic differences between the United States and the UK in the 
war on terror discussed in the introduction to this chapter. In addition, the article did 
provide one of the most detailed accounts, as of the date it was published, of events 
leading up to the August 10th arrest of several suspects allegedly involved in the plot. 
Police surmised the plot to blow up as many as ten airliners over the Atlantic 
Ocean had been planned and preparation had been underway since sometime prior to the 
July 2005 attack on the London mass transit system. The suspected intent of the plot was 
to mark the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Later in November  
2006, the realities of the plot became even more sinister as the public learned the group 
intended to blow up the planes over United States cities rather than over the Atlantic – in 
order to maximize casualties. At the 2006 Infosecurity conference in New York, the head 
of the FBI’s New York offices, Mark Mershon, stated “The plan was to bring them down 
over U.S. cities, not over the ocean.”285 The intent was clearly thought through to 
maximize both the human and economic impact on the United States. 
A key question throughout the investigation remains just how many of the 
suspects were involved in the early planning stages and how many were brought into the 
plot closer to the suspected date of execution. In addition to questions about the numbers 
of suspects involved in the case, there are questions about the actual source or inspiration 
of the attack, and if this source a disgruntled citizen of the UK or possibly an al Qaeda 
affiliate in Pakistan.  
Throughout the investigation, much speculation has taken place suggesting the 
similarities between the August 2006 bomb plot and the 1995 al Qaeda plot named 
Operation Bojinka. The 1995 plot planned by Ramzi Yousef in Manila was intended to 
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blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific Ocean. While many similarities between the two 
plots do exist, one key difference was the use of suicide bombers. Operation Bojinka was 
to utilize explosives placed under seats by bombers. The explosives would be set to 
detonate on a later flight. This plan allowed the bombers to be far away from the 
explosions when they took place, not only allowing them to live, but also making the 
identification of the bombers infinitely more difficult. Planning for the operation went as 
far as to actually test a bomb on a flight, resulting in the death of a Japanese passenger. 
The plot was later discovered following a fire in the would-be attackers’ apartment 
during the bomb-making process. The link between the death of the Japanese tourist and 
the plotters was subsequently made. 
The 2006 investigation drew together counter terrorism and law enforcement 
officials from throughout Europe to find any suspects who might still be at large as well 
as to determine the overall extent of the plot. In early August, German Deputy Interior 
Minister, August Hanning, admitted links had been discovered between Muslim 
extremists located in Germany and individuals detained in the UK.286 Of particular 
concern were potential links between terrorists in Europe and friends, relatives, or other 
acquaintances of the 9/11 Hamburg Cell who may still have had direct ties to al 
Qaeda.287 
Investigators reportedly investigated possible links between the airline plot 
suspects and Said Bahaji. Bahaji is a Moroccan German who is one of the few surviving 
member of the al Qaeda Hamburg cell who has never been captured and prosecuted. The 
suspicion is that e-mails may have been sent in 2004 and 2005 from one of the suspects 
to Bahji’s wife, Nese, who was still living in Hamburg in 2006.288 As Sageman states in 
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his book, Understanding Terror Networks, family ties, either through blood or marriage, 
are often the strongest links in terms of trust in terror organizations and networks. 
The unanticipated trigger for the arrests of airline plotters in the UK was the arrest 
of Rashid Rauf in Pakistan on or around August 9. Rashid Rauf, a British citizen who 
holds dual British-Pakistani citizenship, fled the UK following the stabbing death of his 
uncle in 2002; he was a suspect in the murder.289 The murder was suspected to have been 
some form of honor killing related to a dispute over an arranged marriage.290 While he 
was never charged in the murder, the case was never solved.291 Rashid was arrested in 
Bahawalpur, located in Punjab province, on the August 9, 2006.292 Rashid was 
immediately suspected of having contact with organizations linked to al Qaeda: 
According to Pakistani officials, Mr. Rauf is affiliated with Jaish-e-
Mohammed, the militant Islamic group that is closely linked to Al Qaeda 
and that is battling Indian rule in the mountainous region of Kashmir. The 
group has been officially labeled a terrorist group by the United States 
government and is believed to be responsible for the kidnapping and 
murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Its precursor 
organization, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, trained in Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan. American and Pakistani officials believe that Mr. Rauf 
trained in camps of Al Qaeda in the late 1990’s or later, when that group 
and other militant organizations operated freely in Afghanistan.293 
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Rashid’s sister-in-law is married to the brother of Jaish-e-Mohammed’s founder, 
Maulana Masood Azhar.294 Once again, as was discovered in the 9/11 and many other 
terrorist plots, family ties tend to serve as some of the strongest ties in these 
organizations. 
Shortly after the arrest of Rashid Rauf, “The plotters [in the UK] received a very 
short message to ‘Go now,’ ‘‘ said Franco Frattini, European Union’s security 
commissioner, briefed by British home secretary, John Reid, in London. ‘‘I was 
convinced by British authorities that this message exists.’’295 Concerning the decision to 
act on August 10, 2006, a senior British official reportedly stated, “The aim was to keep 
this operation going for much longer . . . It ended much sooner than we had hoped.’’ 
Rather than risk the suspects destroying evidence, dispersing, or possibly accelerating 
plans to carry out an attack, authorities chose to act immediately, arresting all suspects.296 
There has been discussion and reportedly many disputes over the British tendency to 
monitor a suspected terror network over an extended period of time versus the preference 
in many other European countries and the United States to act on the information much 
more quickly. One reason given by British authorities for wanting to  watch and wait is 
the knowledge that they have the ability to detain suspects for up to twenty-eight days 
without charging them. The time period is much shorter in much of Europe and the 
United States and therefore leaves much less room for authorities to maneuver, at least in 
a legal sense. 
Just prior to the raids on the August 10, sometime on August 9, at least two of the 
would-be suicide bombers recorded their martyrdom tapes. Through the media and the 
Internet, these types of tapes have become the all-too-familiar last testament of those who 
are about to sacrifice themselves in jihad against what these individuals and the 
organizations sponsoring them consider the enemies of Islam. The tapes reinforced the 
claim that the intent of the attack was “revenge against the United States and its 
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‘accomplices,’ Britain and the Jews.”297 One of the individuals on the tapes stated, ‘‘As 
you bomb, you will be bombed; as you kill, you will be killed,’’ adding the hope that God 
would in turn be ‘‘pleased with us and accepts our deed.’’298 Investigators reportedly 
made an ideological link between this statement and the November 12, 2002, message 
from Osama bin Laden.299 In bin Laden’s message, referring to the multiple attacks made 
by Muslims against multiple targets throughout the previous year, bin Laden stated: 
How long will fear, killing, destruction, displacement, orphaning, and 
widowing be our soul destiny, while security, stability, and happiness is 
yours? 
This is injustice. The time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so 
you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there 
will be more to come. 
With God’s will, the Islamic umma has started to strike back with its own 
sons, who have given their pledge to god that they will continue the jihad 
with word and deed so long as they have eyes to see or blood in their 
veins, in order to establish truth and eradicate falsehood.300 
 
In all, at least seven martyrdom tapes were discovered during the course of the 
investigation. Just one day after the initial arrests, sources in the United States reported 
the primary actors were prepared to conduct dry runs of the attack as early as August 11 
and 12.301 Other sources reported the men had conducted Internet searches to determine 
flights to various United States cities with similar departure times.302 Later in the  
 
investigation, however, British authorities clarified the earlier claims by primarily United 
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States sources claiming the plotters were much farther from an executable plan than 
many sources had initially suggested. 
In addition to speculation about the readiness of the cell to execute the plan, 
speculation began to arise about the actual structure of the cells. An unnamed European 
intelligence official described the cell as consisting of an inner and an outer cell: 
. . . the alleged plot consisted of an inner cell of active terrorists and an 
outer cell of logistical supporters who were only loosely informed of the 
attack plans. Members of the outer cell purchased supplies, rented 
apartments and transferred money needed by members of the inner cell, 
the official said. Members of the inner cell planned the attacks and at least 
some were preparing to participate in the missions. Both the inner and 
outer cells had been actively preparing the attack for more than six months 
but all the members may not have known each other.303 
By the end of the day on the August 10, police had arrested 21 suspects following 
what was later learned had been a months-long investigation and observation of the 
suspected terrorist cell. The initial investigation was initiated following tips from the 
general public shortly after the July 2005 attacks. Reportedly, several Walthamstow 
residents contacted police concerning “a small group of angry young Muslims.”304 The 
resulting investigation was given the name, “Operation Overt.”305 The investigation had 
reportedly been underway since at least December of the previous year.306 Additional 
warnings and confirmation that a plot of some form existed came in late June or early 
July of 2006 following the detention and questioning of a Pakistani man crossing the 
Afghanistan / Pakistan border. The man reportedly provided information on a British-
based plot to destroy several commercial airliners.307 
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Operation Overt resulted in 24-hour surveillance of several individuals living in 
Walthamstow that included bugging apartments, tapping of phone lines, surveillance of 
bank transactions, monitoring of internet activity and e-mail traffic, in addition to 
monitoring the physical movements of the suspected individuals.308 The initial focus of 
the investigation was reportedly to determine what, if any, links existed between the 
individuals being monitored and the 7-7 subway bombers, rather than the existence or 
planning and preparation for any new plot. In fact much of the initial investigation 
appears to have been related to the 7-7 subway bombings: 
A senior American law enforcement official said that the British 
disruption of the plot to down airliners began with the follow-up 
investigation after last summer’s suicide attacks on the London subways, 
which killed 56 people, including the 4 bombers. ‘‘MI5 tracked everyone 
involved in the London attacks,’’ the official said. ‘‘Their past 
movements, phone calls and e-mails, everything. It was comprehensive in 
much the same way that the F.B.I. conducted the post-9/11 investigation.’’ 
The investigation led authorities to the suspects in the current plot and 
allowed them to insert an undercover officer, the official said.309 
It was determined that in June 2005, one month prior to the London attacks, a 22-
year-old paid $260,000 cash for an apartment on Forest Road in Wathamstow. The 
apartment was later referred to as the “bomb factory” by authorities and was frequently 
visited by six men who became suspects in the investigation.310 
Agents from MI5 were reportedly successful in installing both audio and video 
equipment and in a secret search of the apartment conducted prior to August 10, 2006, 
agents reportedly discovered proof that the suspects had been experimenting with 
explosives to include the sports drink Lucozade and batteries that had been hollowed 
out.311 However, the focus of the investigation did not appear to be limited to the 
suspect’s homes. As a part of the raids on August 10, police also raided a local Internet 
café in Walthamstow, Haji Telecom, taking 27 hard drives and two disks that had been 
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left by customers.312 The manager of the café was not arrested and did not appear to be a 
part of the investigation.  
Several possible links to Pakistan and the plotters were discovered in addition to 
the arrest of Rashid Rauf. At least two of the suspects travelled to Pakistan sometime 
following the 2005 earthquake as relief workers. Speculation from multiple sources 
suggests that while in Pakistan, the two individuals met with members of al Qaeda 
including Matiur Rehman, a man described as an al Qaeda explosives expert. After 
returning to Britain, the two suspects reportedly received wire transfers of money from 
Pakistan.313  
It is interesting to point out that on the August 9, just before the discovery of the 
airline plot was made public, Alexis Debat of ABC News published an article titled The 
Man Who is Planning the Next Attack on America. The article was about Matiur 
Rehman.314 In an earlier report, Debat had described how Rehman came to be 
responsible for what intelligence officials refer to as the “Rolodex of Jihad” or the names, 
affiliations, and skills of all Pakistani individuals who had trained at al Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan in the late 1990s.315 As previously stated, Rashid Rauf is suspected to have 
attended al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan during this time period. 
Three or four of the suicide bombers in the 7-21 attacks also made trips to 
Pakistan.316 It must also be stated that British security sources have questioned links 
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between Rehman and the airline plot suspects.317 The British government has 
acknowledged reports from Pakistani officials that Rashid Rauf admitted to meeting with 
a leading al Qaeda operative in Pakistan.318 The name of the operative was not given and 
it is unknown if this contact may have been Rehman. In the week that followed the initial 
announcement of the discovery of the plot, a Pakistani official went as far as to state, 
“We have reason to believe that it was al Qaeda sanctioned and was probably cleared by 
al Zawahiri.”319 Other sources claim the plot was sanctioned by a lower level al Qaeda 
member, al Zawahri’s son-in-law, albeit with the knowledge of al Zawahri.320 
In addition to determining any linkages to Pakistan, investigators are also 
concerned with whether the plot actually began in Pakistan or in Britain and who was the 
actual mastermind behind the plot: 
But police have not determined whether the alleged plan was hatched by 
figures in Pakistan or by one or more of the suspects in custody. The 
difficulty of identifying a mastermind and nailing down potential links 
among the transit and alleged airline plots lies in the fluid nature of 
Islamic networks. Connections among suspects may or may not be vital. 
In 2003, for example, subway bomber Khan surfaced on the edges of an 
aborted plot in which suspects stockpiled explosives for a massive truck-
bombing, but investigators did not keep him under surveillance because 
they saw him as a minor player.321 
The linkage of the 7-7 attacks and the airline bomb plot back to Pakistan would 
appear to fit the pattern of previous attacks: 
. . . it could help fit the suspected plane bombing plot into a string of other 
cases in which Pakistani British radicals acquired expertise, inspiration or 
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both from Islamic militant networks in their ancestral homeland. That 
pattern recurred in the transit bombings, an aborted truck- bombing plot 
here in 2003, and a plan that allegedly targeted U.S. financial institutions. 
It also surfaced in the failed follow-up transit attacks two weeks after the 
July 7 blasts, in which four East African immigrants have been charged. 
Although that case was initially seen as a copycat attempt, the discovery 
that at least one of the July 21 suspects also traveled to Pakistan suggests 
at least an indirect link, officials say. 
In fact, some intelligence analysts in the U.S. and Europe wonder whether 
the alleged operatives, who included a 21-year-old who converted to Islam 
only six months ago, had the expertise to pull off the ambitious attack 
under pressure. In previous cases, the progress of plots by the homegrown 
militant cells in Britain depended on lead figures who went back and forth 
to Pakistan for training and direction.322 
At least two of the suicide bombers from the July 2005 attack are known to have 
traveled to Pakistan prior to the attacks. In the case of the airline plot, at least one of the 
individuals is known to have traveled to Pakistan and many others are suspected to have 
done so. Member of the British Parliament Lord Nasir Ahmed, known as a leader to the 
British Pakistani community, told CNN that at least four of the alleged plotters traveled 
to Pakistan, telling their families they were going to help the quake victims.323 Lord 
Ahmed spoke on British Pakistanis traveling to Pakistan to assist with the earthquake 
relief: 
. . . it was possible that those who went [to Pakistan] came into contact 
with the militant Islamic organizations that were doing the relief work on 
the Pakistani-controlled side of Kashmir, where most of the casualties 
were. Indeed, at the time, Jamaat ud Dawa was welcomed by people in the 
area for stepping in where the Pakistani government had failed. The group 
was praised as one of the few providing aid efficiently, while Muslims 
around the world complained that Pakistanis had been abandoned.324 
Jamaat-Ud-Dawa is acknowledged by the United States Department of State as an 
alias for the group Lashkhar-e-Tayyiba (LET). Another known alias for the group is dara 
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Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK). Lashkhar-e-Tayyiba (LET) is designated by the United States as 
a known terrorist organization and has been banned by the Pakistani government.325 
Reports from Pakistani Police seem to further suggest the possibility that 
individuals traveling to Pakistan for the purpose of earthquake relief could have easily 
made contact with terror organizations:  
According to sources in the Pakistani Police, some of the 18 persons of 
Pakistani origin detained by the British Police in connection with the 
investigation had traveled to Pakistan after the earth-quake of October, 
2005, to work as humanitarian volunteers in the relief camps run by the 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the mother organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba 
(LET), in the POK and in the Balakote area of the North-West Frontier 
Province (NWFP). These sources say that during their stay in the relief 
camps, they were taken by the Jundullah, a Pakistani jihadi terrorist 
organization which is close to Al Qaeda, to its training camps in the 
Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan for training. They later returned to the humanitarian relief camps 
of the JUD.326 
Also of interest to the investigators was the suspected low cost that would be 
required to carry out the attack. Investigators used cost estimates for the 7-7 attacks of 
around $15,000 dollars, realizing that with the exception of plane tickets, the airline plot 
would not be significantly more expensive.327 The availability of British nationals willing 
to conduct the attacks, the absence of any need to pilot the aircraft, and the utilization of 
small explosives constructed from common household items would significantly reduce 
the costs to carry out such and operation in comparison to the attacks of 9/11. 
Authorities in Pakistan also monitored and examined the transfer of a large sum 
of money from Pakistan to the UK. In the UK, The Charity Commission of England froze 
the bank accounts of the UK-based Pakistani charity Crescent Relief under suspicion that 
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money was diverted through Rashid Rauf to support the airline plot.328 Crescent Relief 
was co-founded in 2000 by Abdul Rauf, father of Rashid Rauf and Mohammad Mumtaz, 
Rashid’s uncle. Abdul emigrated from Pakistan to the UK where he operated a bakery 
specializing in Pakistani flat bread and cookies. Throughout his time in the UK it is 
claimed that Abdul maintained strong ties with Pakistan, specifically his village of Haveli 
where he is said to have financed the construction of a mosque.329 Maintaining close ties 
with their country of origin is not uncommon among Pakistani immigrants in Europe. 
Abdul was reportedly attending a wedding in Haveli around August 10, 2006, and there 
are conflicting reports to this day as to whether or not he was arrested by Pakistani 
authorities.330  
Crescent Relief came under suspicion following an attempt by an individual to 
make a wire transfer of $94,000 from the charity’s Barclays account to an account at 
Saudi Pak Bank. The individual failed to provide proper identification and the transfer 
was not completed.331 In addition to money transfers, a secretary working near the 
bakery’s warehouse in Dagenham reported suspicious activity in and around the 
warehouse, prompting additional investigations.332  
Other media sources were more specific in their accusations against Crescent 
Relief: 
A UK-based Islamic charity organisation remitted a huge amount of 
money to three individuals in three different bank accounts in Mirpur, 
Azad Kashmir, in December last year with the sole purpose of helping its 
recipients and their organisations carry out the aircraft bombing plan in the 
UK, insider sources told Daily Times yesterday. 
An investigation carried out by Daily Times showed that Muslim Charity 
of UK remitted not so long ago a huge amount of money under the head of 
“earthquake relief” to the accounts of three individuals in three different 
banks – Saudi Pak Bank, Standard Chartered and Habib Bank Ltd. One of 
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these banks is UK based and has its presence in Azad Kashmir because of 
a huge number of British citizens of Kashmir origin in UK. The money 
was transferred from UK to banks in Azad Kashmir through Barclays Plc. 
 What raised alarm among British sleuths specialising in finances was the 
fact that the entire money was remitted to three individuals, not to any 
organisation or organisations involved in the relief work.333 
2. The Players 
The following list is of known and suspected members of the airline bomb plot:334 
Name: Abu Obaidah al-Masri 335 
Role: Terrorist Operations Planner (named by Pakistani authorities) 
Nationality: Egyptian 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: al Qaeda 
 
Name: Shamin Mohammed Uddin336 
Age: 36 (Nov 22, 1970) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: Stoke Newington, London, UK 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Eldest of 19 suspects identified by Bank of England 
 
Name: Assan Abdullah Khan337 
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Age: 22 (Oct 24, 1984) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan338 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Abdula Ahmed Ali 
Employment: Trainee Probation Officer 
Address: London, UK, E17 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Lived in Walthamstow 
 
Name: Muhammed Usman Saddique (Uzi)339 
Age: 24 (April 23 1982) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Worked in pizza restaurant 
Address: Walthamstow, London, UK, E17 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
 
Name: Nabeel Hussain340 
Age: 22 (March 10, 1984 – Waltham Forest, UK)  
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Tanvir and Umair (also detained) 
Employment: Hospital worker 
Address: London, UK, E4 / Ilford, Essex, UK 
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Additional Information:  
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
  
Name: Abdul Waheed (Don Stewart-Whyte)341 
Age: 19 (as of Aug 13, 2006)342 born in Eastbourne, East Sussex343 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: UK 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Half-brother of model Heather Stewart-Whyte (claims never met) 
Employment: None stated 
Address: None stated 
Additional Information: 
Converted to Islam six months prior to plot discovery344 
 
Name: Abdul Rauf345 
Age: 52 (as of Aug 25, 2006 – Born in Pakistan) 
Role: Family Member, Co-founder London based Crescent Relief346 
Date or Arrest: Mid August 2006 (unclear if he has in fact been detained) 
Place or Arrest: Pakistan 
Nationality: British / Pakistani 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan347 
Other Affiliation: Crescent Relief 
Family Ties: Father of Tayyib and Rashid Rauf 
Employment: Bakery owner 
Address:  
Additional Information: 
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Co-founded Crescent Relief charity in London in 2000 
Crescent Relief claims he is no longer affiliated with the charity 
  
Name: Shazad Kuram Ali (Kuram Ali)348 
Age: 27 (June 11, 1979) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: Crescent Relief 
Family Ties:  None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
May have visited Pakistan in 2006 
 
Name: Rashid Rauf349 
Age: 25350 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 9, 2006 
Place or Arrest: Bahawalpur, Pakistan 
Nationality: British / Pakistani 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan351 
Other Affiliation: Jaish-e-Mohammed, al Qaeda 
Family Ties: Brother – Tayib Rauf; Father – Abdul Rauf; Uncle – Maroon Rauf 
Employment: Not stated 
Address: Not stated 
Additional Information: 
Charged in Pakistan with Terrorism, Forgery, Carrying Explosives 
Dec 2006, Pakistani judge declared terrorism charges unfounded but did not 
dismiss other charges 
 
Name: Maroof Rauf352 
Age: 20 (1987) 
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Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 (while reported in The Daily Mail on 11 Aug 06, 
the British gov’t has not acknowledged his arrest) 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Possible brother of Tayib and Rashid Rauf 
Employment: Not stated 




Name: Mohammed Yasar Gulzar353 
Age: 26 (1981) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: August 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: Not stated 
Country of Family Origin: None stated 
Other Affiliation: Not stated 
Family Ties: Not stated 
Employment: Not stated 
Address: Not stated 
Additional Information: 
Aug 29, 2006 – Charged with conspiracy to murder, intending to smuggle 
explosives into the UK 
 
Name: Waseem Kayani354 
Age: 29 (April 28, 1977) 
Role: Associate 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: None stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Taxi driver 
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
May have been released from police custody                                                  
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Attended religious meetings with other suspects 
 
Name: Nese Bahaji355 
Age: Not stated 
Role: Hamburg cell family member (wife) 
Date or Arrest: Not arrested 
Place or Arrest: Not arrested 
Nationality: Not stated 
Country of Family Origin: None stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Wife of Said Bahaji, member of 9/11 Hamburg cell 
Employment: None stated 
Address: Hamburg, Germany 
Additional Information: 
Married to Said Bahaji in 1999 
Reportedly in e-mail contact with several airline plot members / plotters 
Under surveillance by the German government 
 
Name: Abdulah Ahmed Ali (Abdullah Ali Ahmed Khan, Abdullah Anmed Ali /  
Ahmed Abdullah Ali)356 
Age: 26 (Oct 10, 1980) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: None stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: None stated 
Additional Information: 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing acts of terrorism 
 
Name: Umar Islam (Umar Brian, Brian Oliver Young, Brian Young, Omar 
Islam)357 
Age: 20 (April 23, 1978) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: London, UK 
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Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: None stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK; Plainstow, London, UK; 
London, UK, E7; London, UK, E15 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
Married with one child 
Parents of Caribbean origin 
Changed name from Brian Oliver Young 
 
Name: Waheed Arafat Khan (Arafat Waheed Khan)358 
Age: 25 (May 18, 1981) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British / Pakistani 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan359 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Assan Abdullah Khan; also described as brother of 
Abdula Ahmed Ali 
Employment: None stated 
Address: London, UK, E17 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
Some news reported his wife and baby were also arrested 
 
Name: Assad Sarwar (Assad Ali Sarwar)360 
Age: 26 (May 24, 1980) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
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Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother Amjad Sarwar 
Employment: None stated 
Address: High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, UK; Birmingham, UK 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
Brother denied he had any links to terrorism 
 
Name: Osman Adam Khatib361 
Age: 20 (Dec 7, 1986) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: London, UK, E17 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
 
Name: Ibrahim Savant (Oliver Savant)362 
Age: 26 (Dec 19, 1980) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Iran363 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Accountant 
Address: London, UK, E17; Stoke Newington, London, UK, N16 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
                                                 
361 Global Security, “Osman Adam Khatib,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
security/profiles/osman_adam_khatib.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
362 Global Security, “Ibrahim Savant,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ 
profiles/ibrahim_savant.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
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Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
Born Oliver, changed name to Ibrahim as he became more religious 
Married 
 
Name: Waheed Zaman (Wassem Zaman)364 
Age: 22 (May 27, 1984) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: Walthamstow, Greater London, UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: Biomedical science student 
Address: Walthamstow 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
Head of the Islamic Society at London Metropolitan University 
Sister denied he had any links to terrorism 
 
Name: Abdul Muneem Patel365 
Age: 17 (April 17, 1989) 
Role: Associate 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: None stated 
Employment: None stated 
Address: London, UK, E5 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with possession of terrorist materials 
Appears to be the 17-year-old male repeatedly mentioned in news reports 
According to charges had book on how to build bombs, suicide notes and wills, 
and a map of Afghanistan that could be useful to an individual preparing an act of 
terrorism 
 
Name: Tanvir Hussain366                                                  
364 Global Security, “Waheed Zaman,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ 
profiles/waheed_zaman.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
365 Global Security, “Abdul Muneem Patel,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
security/profiles/abdul_muneem_patel.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
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Age: 26 (Feb 21, 1981) 
Role: Member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Possible brother of Umair and Nabeel Hussain 
Employment: Mobile Phone company 
Address: Leyton, London, UK, E10 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with conspiracy to murder, preparing terrorist acts 
Charges suggest his role in the plot began after Jan 1, 2006 
 
Name: Cossor Ali (Cossar Ali, maiden name – Anwar)367 
Age: 22 (Dec12, 1982)368 
Role: Wife of Abdula Ahmed Ali 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Wife of Abdula Ahmed Ali 
Employment: None stated 
Address: London, UK, E17 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations 
Charges suggest she had some knowledge of the plot in 2005 
Reportedly has an infant child 
 
Name: Umair Hussain369 
Age: 25 (Oct 9, 1981) 
Role: Family member 
Date or Arrest: Not stated 
Place or Arrest: Not stated 
                                                 
366 Global Security, “Tanvir Hussain,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ 
profiles/tanvir_hussain.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
367 Global Security, “Cossor Ali,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ 
profiles/cossor_ali.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
368  BBC News, “Assets Frozen in Terror Plot Inquiry,”BBCNews.Co.UK, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi 
/uk_news/ 4782343.stm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
369 Global Security, “Umair Hussain,” GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ 
profiles/umair_hussain.htm (accessed February 2, 2007). 
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Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: Not stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Mehran and Nabeel Hussain 
Employment: Not stated 
Address: London, UK, E14; London, UK, E1; Live in Chingford 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Charged Aug 24, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations 
Acquitted due to lack of evidence Nov 1, 2006 
His charges indicate authorities believe he was not a central player in the plot 
 
Name: Tayib Rauf370 
Age: 22 (April 26, 1984) 
Role: Family member 
Date or Arrest: Aug 10, 2006 
Place or Arrest: Birmingham, UK 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Pakistan371 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Rashid Rauf; son of Abdul Rauf 
Employment: None stated 
Address: Birmingham, UK 
Additional Information: 
Bank of England froze assets on Aug 11, 2006 
Released without charge Aug 23, 2006 
 
Name: Mehran Hussain372 
Age: 25 (Estimated) 
Role: Family member 
Date or Arrest: Not stated 
Place or Arrest: Not stated 
Nationality: British 
Country of Family Origin: Not clearly stated 
Other Affiliation: None stated 
Family Ties: Brother of Umair and Nabeel Hussain 
Employment: None stated 
Address: None stated 
Additional Information: 
Charged Aug 21, 2006 with failure to disclose knowledge of terrorist preparations 
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Charges suggest he had knowledge of the plot starting 23 Sept, 2005 
Charges dismissed on Nov 1, 2006 due to lack of evidence 
 
3. Conclusions 
As the largest group of the three, this one understandably possessed the largest 
variation in age. Three of the individuals’ ages were indeterminable, though two others 
were found being over the age of 35. The remaining 21 individuals were under the age of 
34, with 11 under the age of 24. Twenty of these 26 individuals were determined to have 
been born in the United Kingdom with five individuals’ place of birth being 
indeterminable, with only one person – the oldest member of the group – clearly born 
outside the United Kingdom. Twenty of these individuals possessed single British 
citizenship and three individuals possessed dual Pakistani citizenship. This suggests, but 
is unconfirmed, that two additional individuals may have been born in Pakistan. The 
ethnicity of the majority of this group is unclear, as the ethnicity of 18 of the individuals 
was undetermined. However, at least six were of Pakistani decent.   
The majority of these individuals lived in Walthamstow or High Wycombe. 
Walthamstow is located is east London while High Wycombe is a suburb located 
approximate 30 miles northwest of London. A few remaining suspects lived in 
Birmingham. 
The Muslim community in Walthamstow was described as a large community of 
more than 17,000 Pakistani immigrants, “many of whom immigrated from two regions, 
Meerpur in Kashmir and from around Jhelum, according to Mohsin Kahn, the managing 
director of the Daily Ausaf, a newspaper edited in Pakistan that has an office in 
Walthamstow.”373 
At least three of the suspects detained in early August were women and the 
majority were described as middle-class. At least one detainee was a student and had 
been the head of the Islamic society at his university in London. 
Several of the suspects appeared to be financially well off and had ready access to 
cash. Suspect Tayib Rauf, who was released from custody early in the investigation, 
reportedly paid $189,000 in cash for a home in Birmingham in March 1004. In May 
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2004, then 24-year-old suspect Khuram Shazad Ali purchased a home in High Wycombe 
for $378,000. It is unclear if he purchased the home from his father. However, three 
weeks later, the Ali family purchased a home in the same immediate area for 
$359,000.374 
D. COMPARISON OF CASE STUDIES 
The critical question that must be asked is “What has caused 40 people out of a 
population of 1.5 million Muslims to act in such a manner?” The answer to this question 
is unfortunately still unclear, although it is possible to state that, of the other minority 
religious groups in the UK discussed in this paper, none have acted or struck out so 
egregiously as have these 40 members of the Muslim community. The majority of these 
other groups, although significantly smaller, are similar in many of the economic and 
social criteria discussed in Chapter III. Although, as previously stated, none of these 
groups consistently rate as low as does the Muslim population. As stated initially, this 
thesis has deliberately ignored the issues of violence related to Northern Ireland. Our 
decision to discount this significant portion of British history was not out of disregard for 
the impact it has had on the United Kingdom, but rather due to the fact that the history 
and circumstances surrounding “The Troubles” is on the whole a completely different 
situation. We contend that the Irish were specifically targeting the British with their 
terrorist violence. The Islamic terrorists of concern here, on the other hand, were not 
concerned with targeting the UK in particular, but rather they targeted the UK as a 
convenient portion of “the West.” 
In his December 2006 speech, the Prime Minister attempted to define the issue of 
integration in relation to the 7-7 bombing as follows: 
I always thought after 7/7 our first reaction would be very British: we stick 
together; but that our second reaction, in time, would also be very British: 
we’re not going to be taken for a ride. 
People want to make sense of two emotions: our recognition of what we 
legitimately hold in common and what we legitimately hold distinct. 
When I decided to make this speech about multiculturalism and 
integration, some people entirely reasonably said that integration or lack 
of it was not the problem. The 7/7 bombers were integrated at one level in 
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terms of lifestyle and work. Others in many communities live lives very 
much separate and set in their own community and own culture, but are no 
threat to anyone. 
But this is, in truth, not what I mean when I talk of integration. Integration, 
in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is 
about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. 
It isn’t about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and 
duties that go with being a member of our society. 
Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect 
right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to 
conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is 
about. That is what is legitimately distinctive. 
But when it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule 
of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its 
shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold  
 
in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that 
point no distinctive culture or religion supercedes our duty to be part of an 
integrated United Kingdom. 375 
The reality, however, is that while the individuals involved in these plots may have lived 
the majority of their lives in Britain, they had very little in common with the greater 
British community and had much in common with the isolated community to which they 
belonged. In the case of these 40 individuals, policies intended to promote unity through 
diversity resulted in isolation. The clear examples of this isolation were discussed in 
Chapter III.  
There are highly relevant comparisons to be made between the three plots that 
lead us in the direction of understanding what would cause citizens of a Western country 
to attack their own countrymen. First and foremost, the issue of religion must be 
addressed. It should be clear by now that all forty of the individuals were Muslim. As 
already discussed, Muslims were the third least likely religious group to identify 
themselves as British versus their religion. A key assumption is that these individuals saw 
themselves as Muslims first and Britons second, if at all.  
While additional evidence may come to light at a later date, it should also be clear 
that all of these individuals, with the exception of Don Stewart-Whyte, Jermaine Lindsay,                                                  
375 Blair, “Our Nation’s Future.” 
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and possibly a third individual, were from Islamic families. Whyte was born in the UK 
and was raised Methodist, converting to Islam only six months prior to the discovery of 
the airline plot. Lindsay was born in Jamaica, immigrated to the UK in 1986 and 
converted to Islam along with his mother sometime in 2000. While the remainder may 
not have been fervent Muslims throughout their life, there was a tendency in multiple 
cases where the individual became increasingly more religious in the time leading up to 
the attack or participation in the plot. This is a commonality that cannot be ignored and is 
a trend discussed by Edwin Bakker in his 2006 study of 28 Euro centric networks.376  
At least 23 of the individuals were born in the UK, with nine individuals’ places 
of birth being undeterminable. The 7-21 case is the only case of the three where it 
appears none of the individuals were born in the UK, although four of the eight 
individuals’ places of birth were not determined. However, one of the individuals in the 
7-21 case was a British citizen, and four held dual citizenship with Britain and another 
country. Additionally, at least two of these individuals immigrated to the UK at relatively 
young ages (one at 11 and one at 14), which suggests that they should have been 
somewhat integrated into British culture. However, their willingness to participate in the 
plot demonstrates their lack of integration on a cultural or moral level and supports the 
theory of isolation from the greater British community. 
 
Figure 14.   Participant’s Place of Birth 
 
 7-7 (6) 7-21 (8) Airline Plot (26) Total (40) 
Not Clearly Stated  4 5 9 
Britain 3  20 23 
Egypt 1   1 
Eritrea  1  1 
Ethiopia  2  2 
India 1   1 
Jamaica 1   1 
Pakistan   1 1 
Somalia  1  1 
 
In each of the cases, there appear to be at least loose ties to Pakistan. In the case 
of the 7-7 bombing, three individuals were of Pakistani descent. In the case of the airline 
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plot, six individuals were clearly of Pakistani descent, with the media repeatedly 
reporting that the majority of the suspects involved – as many as 17 or more – were 
Britons of Pakistani origin. In addition to ethnicity, one or more members of each group 
traveled to Pakistan in the time leading up to the attack or the discovery of the plot. Still, 
it is not uncommon in the Pakistani community for families to maintain close ties with 
their country or even village of ancestral origin, as in the case of Abdul Rauf. Even so, 
there is an undeniably strong participation by or linkage to the Pakistani Muslim 
communities in two of these three events. This is not completely surprising, as 42% of 
the British Pakistani community is Muslim (Figure 1), the largest ethnic concentration in 
the Muslim community. Additionally, 18% of the Muslims in the UK were born in 
Pakistan and 39% in Asia as a whole. Only 46% of the Muslims in the UK were born in 
the UK (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 15.   Participant’s Ethnicity 
 
 7-7 (6) 7-21 (8)  Airline Plot (26)  Total (40)  
Not Clearly Stated  1 18 19 
Egyptian 1   1 
Eritrean  1  1 
Ethiopian  2  2 
Ghana  1  1 
Indian 1   1 
Iran   1 1 
Jamaican 1   1 
Pakistani 3  6 9 
Somali  3  3 
United Kingdom   1 1 
 
 
Regarding age at the time of the event, 35 of the 40 individuals fell into the 16-34 
age category, with three individuals’ ages being unclear. Only two individuals fell into 
the 35-64 age category. Of the individuals in the 16-34 age category, 18 were in the 
category of 16-24 and 17 were in the category of 25-34. As already stated, this is not 
entirely surprising, as Muslims in the UK have the youngest age profile of all religions, 
with 70% of the Muslim population being under the age of 34.  
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Figure 16.   Participant’s Age Profile 
 
 7-7 (6) 7-21 (8) Airline Plot (26) Total (40) 
Not Clearly Stated   3 3 
16-24 3 4 11 18 
25-34 3 4 10 17 
35-64   2 2 
 
The age profile was seen as relevant when compared to measures such as rates of 
volunteerism. Stated more specifically: the age groups less involved in their community 
would be expected to be more prone to violence against it. Muslims in the 16-24 age 
category – the largest group of participants – were the second least likely to be involved 
in civic activities. Only Hindus over 50 were less civically involved. Conversely, 
Muslims in the age group 25-49 were the third most likely group to volunteer behind 
those claiming no religion and Christians respectively (Figure 12). While this age 
category does include 17 participants in the three plots, it is more difficult to compare this 
second age group as the volunteerism data covers a 24-year age gap. This is a significant 
span and if the data were available, we feel there would be differences in the level of 
volunteerism when compared against smaller age spans or at least against the same age 
categories used to describe the age profiles of specific religious groups (Figure 7). 
Among UK Muslims of working age, 33% had no qualifications, and Muslims 
born in the UK were twice as likely as Muslims born outside the UK to possess 
qualifications. Of the three groups just discussed, just over half were clearly born in the 
UK, yet only six individuals definitely possessed any qualification or had attended at 
least some college. While it is possible more than six of these individuals did possess 
either educational qualifications or had attended at least some college, this information 
was not mentioned in any of the data reviewed in the development of this thesis. It is 
important to note here, the biographical data available for the 7-7 and 7-21 events was the 
most detailed of the three occurences. These two events also contained the most 
significant numbers of British citizens. 
Concerning employment, Muslim men and women had the highest rate of 
unemployment in the UK. Of the individuals included, 25 of the individuals’ employment 
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could not be confirmed, six were employed in what were considered skilled jobs, two 
were employed in unskilled jobs, six were unemployed (three of whom were drawing 


















There can be no question that the jihad is global, and is directed at anyone who 
stands in the way of the radical Islamist dogma. Targeting of non-Muslims has been a 
reality since the beginning of Islam, but the indiscriminate targeting of anyone – to 
include noncombatants and other Muslims – is a new technique. 
Though jihadis have traditionally come from Muslim nations, the new breed of 
transnational jihadis are as prone to be members of the local community as they are to be 
outsiders. Therein may lie the roots of their radicalization: they may have the same sense 
of impotence in fighting the establishment as their brothers have in their restrained 
Muslim societies. But in the case of transnational terror in non-Muslim nations, it is only 
the ideology that is transnational – the terror is home-grown. And, rather than being 
grounded in political repression, economic and social repression are what give it a voice. 
While economic repression opens the door, multiculturalism helps to swing it 
wide. By lending inordinate and unwarranted legitimacy to minority cultures, 
multiculturalism in turn instills an inappropriate sense of cultural superiority which can 
manifest in a desire to stay segregated from the majority culture. Multiculturalism 
enables the environment that allows specific minority groups to evolve in a vacuum, 
absent from the influence of the rest of society. This situation allows the minority culture 
to develop apart from the majority, and it allows the minority culture to maintain its sense 
of superiority without having to confront the reality of its true standing in society. The 
end result is a sub-culture that evolves with completely different norms and mores that 
are in many ways incompatible with the greater society. 
This evolution, at least in the case of the Muslim population of the UK, has 
resulted in the acculturation or creation of a youth culture that is further economically 
disadvantaged, in addition to being out of touch with the greater British culture that 
surrounds it. Special privilege for a minority group virtually ensures they will develop a 
sense of entitlement (deserved or not), and provides the inroad for delegitimizing the 
“parent” culture. This sense of entitlement, absent a requirement for any sort of 
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reciprocity, is at the heart of the issue at hand. The situation is further compounded by the 
relative youth of the entire Muslim population. 
Societies that encourage multicultural extremism are, simply put, hastening their 
own demise. The extremists among the interlopers have no qualms about imposing their 
cultural demands on those around them. In fact, the extremists have identified and seek to 
maximize the advantages that a multiculturalist system provides them. As cultural 
chauvinists, they have no need to care about that which they supersede. In fact, 
multiculturalism in practice practically encourages this type of behavior. And, while the 
parent culture certainly doesn’t need to quash all “other” forms of ethnic difference (à la 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World), it is critical for a culture to maintain some level of 
common identity. It is for this reason that organizations such as the Commission for 
Racial Equality have recently begun pushing for a policy of integration to replace the 
previous policy of multiculturalism. However, there are signs that this integration is not 
occurring. Indications include reports in March and April of 2007 that many British 
schools we dropping study and discussion of the Holocaust and the Crusades from their 
curriculum for fear of offending Muslim and other cultures. The idea that an education 
system would somehow attempt to alter or ignore significant historical events to 
accommodate specific ethnic groups supports only further acculturation and ensures 
integration will not take place any time soon. Several significant events have shaped the 
20th and 21st centuries, but few as much as the Second World War and the Holocaust. 
Ignoring one of the key lessons of the 20th century is especially frightening considering 
the religious undertones of the threats faced by societies in the 21st century. 
The solution to this dilemma may prove elusive, especially when one considers 
that a key aspect to any solution is the education and integration of today’s Muslim 
youth. These youth are the product of a system of multiculturalism and this cannot be 
ignored – especially when considering many of these youth already have, or are preparing 
to have, families of their own. While the immediate impacts and lessons learned 
concerning the situation in the UK have indeed been painful, the long-term impact will 
not truly be felt for another 20 to 30 years. It is at that point – when the children of 
today’s disaffected British Muslim population begin to come of age – that the effects of 
the past 30 or more years of multiculturalism can truly be assessed. The difficulty of 
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society injecting itself into the lives of this critical population is immense and may prove 
impossible. However, the failure to do so will virtually ensure more home-grown terrorist 
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